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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+OBohkiXZQ3rZENRhvQgcjBemoTvXVZK4Bc=KsS1fhpw@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 14:04:53 -0800 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call On Fri, Feb 8, 2019 at 4:16 AM Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com> wrote: > +.macro RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_NOCLOBBER > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET > + PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS > + call randomize_kstack > + POP_REGS > +#endif > +.endm > + > [...] > @@ -268,6 +268,8 @@ syscall_return_via_sysret: > */ > STACKLEAK_ERASE_NOCLOBBER > > + RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_NOCLOBBER Probably we could extract the PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS and POP_REGS out here from both this and stackleak to avoid doing it twice? -- Kees Cook
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