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Message-Id: <1549628149-11881-1-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2019 14:15:48 +0200
From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: luto@...nel.org,
tglx@...utronix.de,
mingo@...hat.com,
bp@...en8.de,
peterz@...radead.org,
keescook@...omium.org,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH] Early version of thread stack randomization
I would really like to get an early feedback and opinions
on this stack randomization feature since there are many
ways on how this can be developed further, and I want to
hear all the opinions and objections first.
This is based on my 4.20 stable branch, compiles, boots
and can be played with.
I also have a repo for this, if it is more convenient
for anyone.
Elena Reshetova (1):
x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call
arch/Kconfig | 15 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/entry/common.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 4 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 15 ++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
include/linux/sched.h | 3 +++
include/linux/sched/task_stack.h | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
kernel/fork.c | 10 ++++++++++
mm/kmemleak.c | 2 +-
mm/usercopy.c | 2 +-
14 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--
2.7.4
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