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Message-Id: <20190129003422.9328-10-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:34:11 -0800
From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org,
hpa@...or.com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
linux_dti@...oud.com,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-mm@...ck.org,
will.deacon@....com,
ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org,
kristen@...ux.intel.com,
deneen.t.dock@...el.com,
Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 09/20] x86/kprobes: instruction pages initialization enhancements
From: Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>
Make kprobes instruction pages read-only (and executable) after they are
set to prevent them from mistaken or malicious modifications.
This is a preparatory patch for a following patch that makes module
allocated pages non-executable and sets the page as executable after
allocation.
While at it, do some small cleanup of what appears to be unnecessary
masking.
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index 4ba75afba527..fac692e36833 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -431,8 +431,20 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
void *page;
page = module_alloc(PAGE_SIZE);
- if (page)
- set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
+ if (page == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * First make the page read-only, and then only then make it executable
+ * to prevent it from being W+X in between.
+ */
+ set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: Once additional kernel code protection mechanisms are set, ensure
+ * that the page was not maliciously altered and it is still zeroed.
+ */
+ set_memory_x((unsigned long)page, 1);
return page;
}
@@ -440,8 +452,12 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
/* Recover page to RW mode before releasing it */
void free_insn_page(void *page)
{
- set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
- set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
+ /*
+ * First make the page non-executable, and then only then make it
+ * writable to prevent it from being W+X in between.
+ */
+ set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page, 1);
+ set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page, 1);
module_memfree(page);
}
--
2.17.1
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