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Message-ID: <CALCETrUMAsXoZogEJg7ssv0CO56vzBV2C7VotmWcwNM7iH9Wqw@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2019 12:27:23 -0800 From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, linux_dti@...oud.com, linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>, LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com>, "Dock, Deneen T" <deneen.t.dock@...el.com>, Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/17] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text poking On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 4:33 PM Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com> wrote: > > From: Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com> > > text_poke() can potentially compromise the security as it sets temporary > PTEs in the fixmap. These PTEs might be used to rewrite the kernel code > from other cores accidentally or maliciously, if an attacker gains the > ability to write onto kernel memory. i think this may be sufficient, but barely. > + pte_clear(poking_mm, poking_addr, ptep); > + > + /* > + * __flush_tlb_one_user() performs a redundant TLB flush when PTI is on, > + * as it also flushes the corresponding "user" address spaces, which > + * does not exist. > + * > + * Poking, however, is already very inefficient since it does not try to > + * batch updates, so we ignore this problem for the time being. > + * > + * Since the PTEs do not exist in other kernel address-spaces, we do > + * not use __flush_tlb_one_kernel(), which when PTI is on would cause > + * more unwarranted TLB flushes. > + * > + * There is a slight anomaly here: the PTE is a supervisor-only and > + * (potentially) global and we use __flush_tlb_one_user() but this > + * should be fine. > + */ > + __flush_tlb_one_user(poking_addr); > + if (cross_page_boundary) { > + pte_clear(poking_mm, poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE, ptep + 1); > + __flush_tlb_one_user(poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE); > + } In principle, another CPU could still have the old translation. Your mutex probably makes this impossible, but it makes me nervous. Ideally you'd use flush_tlb_mm_range(), but I guess you can't do that with IRQs off. Hmm. I think you should add an inc_mm_tlb_gen() here. Arguably, if you did that, you could omit the flushes, but maybe that's silly. If we start getting new users of use_temporary_mm(), we should give some serious thought to the SMP semantics. Also, you're using PAGE_KERNEL. Please tell me that the global bit isn't set in there. --Andy
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