[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez1o3gzBJJynzN6f=+jFsPCXb4uHDhhg_vWMvYzcPZJVvA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 01:48:32 +0100
From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To: Jason Yan <yanaijie@...wei.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, zhaohongjiang@...wei.com,
miaoxie@...wei.com, Li Bin <huawei.libin@...wei.com>,
Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] usercopy: skip the check if not a real usercopy
On Thu, Jan 3, 2019 at 10:36 AM Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jan 2, 2019 at 12:10 PM Jason Yan <yanaijie@...wei.com> wrote:
> > Some kernel codes use copy_to/from_user to copy data between kernel
> > buffers by calling set_fs(KERNEL_DS). Hardened usercopy will check these
> > objects and sometimes soft lockup may happen as follows:
> >
> > [ 96.314420] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#4 stuck for 22s! [sh:356]
> > ......
> > [ 96.674904] Call Trace:
> > [ 96.684489] __check_object_size+0x1f1/0x460
> > [ 96.691669] __probe_kernel_write+0x195/0x390
> > [ 96.696821] ftrace_write+0x67/0xa0
>
> I think it makes sense to focus on the __probe_kernel_write(), not the
> KERNEL_DS.
>
> >
> > It's unnecessary to check these objects for copying between kernel buffers.
> > So skip all hardened usercopy tests.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@...wei.com>
> > CC: Li Bin <huawei.libin@...wei.com>
> > CC: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@...wei.com>
> > ---
> > mm/usercopy.c | 5 +++++
> > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
> > index 852eb4e53f06..8a0a1854f564 100644
> > --- a/mm/usercopy.c
> > +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
> > @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
> > #include <linux/atomic.h>
> > #include <linux/jump_label.h>
> > #include <asm/sections.h>
> > +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> >
> > /*
> > * Checks if a given pointer and length is contained by the current
> > @@ -255,6 +256,10 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
> > if (static_branch_unlikely(&bypass_usercopy_checks))
> > return;
> >
> > + /* Skip all tests if it is not a real usercopy. */
> > + if (uaccess_kernel())
> > + return;
> > +
> > /* Skip all tests if size is zero. */
> > if (!n)
> > return;
>
> As an alternative, maybe it would make sense to only do this when the
> access is coming through __probe_kernel_read() and
> __probe_kernel_write()? These functions are specifically for accessing
> arbitrary kernel memory, including via things like kcore and kgdb; so
> I don't think usercopy restrictions make sense for them. I'm actually
> surprised that people haven't complained about this earlier.
Ah, nevermind. Kees and me talked and figured out that I got confused
about what usercopy checks do to probe_kernel_read(); specifically,
that they don't apply to the "user" side of the usercopy.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
