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Message-ID: <0f7d39f8-035b-8566-94c9-ea836b280e24@ssi.gouv.fr>
Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 14:29:35 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mickael.salaun@....gouv.fr>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
CC: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>, kernel list
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, James
Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Kees Cook
<keescook@...omium.org>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>, Michael
Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@...il.com>, <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
<philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>, <shuah@...nel.org>,
<thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>, <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>,
<yves-alexis.perez@....gouv.fr>, Kernel Hardening
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/5] Yama: Enforces noexec mounts or file
executability through O_MAYEXEC
On 03/01/2019 12:17, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 3:49 PM Mickaël Salaün
> <mickael.salaun@....gouv.fr> wrote:
>> On 12/12/2018 18:09, Jann Horn wrote:
>>> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 9:18 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>>> Enable to either propagate the mount options from the underlying VFS
>>>> mount to prevent execution, or to propagate the file execute permission.
>>>> This may allow a script interpreter to check execution permissions
>>>> before reading commands from a file.
>>>>
>>>> The main goal is to be able to protect the kernel by restricting
>>>> arbitrary syscalls that an attacker could perform with a crafted binary
>>>> or certain script languages. It also improves multilevel isolation
>>>> by reducing the ability of an attacker to use side channels with
>>>> specific code. These restrictions can natively be enforced for ELF
>>>> binaries (with the noexec mount option) but require this kernel
>>>> extension to properly handle scripts (e.g., Python, Perl).
>>>>
>>>> Add a new sysctl kernel.yama.open_mayexec_enforce to control this
>>>> behavior. A following patch adds documentation.
> [...]
>>>> +{
>>>> + if (!(mask & MAY_OPENEXEC))
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * Match regular files and directories to make it easier to
>>>> + * modify script interpreters.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
>>>> + return 0;
>>>
>>> So files are subject to checks, but loading code from things like
>>> sockets is always fine?
>>
>> As I said in a previous email, these checks do not handle fifo either.
>> This is relevant in a threat model targeting persistent attacks (and
>> with additional protections/restrictions). We may want to only whitelist
>> fifo, but I don't get how a socket is relevant here. Can you please clarify?
>
> I don't think that there's a security problem here. I just think it's
> weird to have the extra check when it seems to me like it isn't really
> necessary - nobody is going to want to execute a socket or fifo
> anyway, right?
Right, the fifo whitelisting should answer your concern then.
>
>>>
>>>> + if ((open_mayexec_enforce & YAMA_OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_MOUNT) &&
>>>> + !(mask & MAY_EXECMOUNT))
>>>> + return -EACCES;
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * May prefer acl_permission_check() instead of generic_permission(),
>>>> + * to not be bypassable with CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (open_mayexec_enforce & YAMA_OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_FILE)
>>>> + return generic_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
>>>> +
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>>> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, yama_inode_permission),
>>>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
>>>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
>>>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, yama_task_prctl),
>>>> @@ -447,6 +489,37 @@ static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
>>>> return proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> +static int yama_dointvec_bitmask_macadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
>>>> + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
>>>> + loff_t *ppos)
>>>> +{
>>>> + int error;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (write) {
>>>> + struct ctl_table table_copy;
>>>> + int tmp_mayexec_enforce;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
>>>> + return -EPERM;
>>>
>>> Don't put capable() checks in sysctls, it doesn't work.
>>>
>>
>> I tested it and the root user can indeed open the file even if the
>> process doesn't have CAP_MAC_ADMIN, however writing in the sysctl file
>> is denied. Btw there is a similar check in the previous function
>> (yama_dointvec_minmax).
>
> It's still wrong. If an attacker without CAP_MAC_ADMIN opens the
> sysctl file, then passes the file descriptor to a setcap binary that
> has CAP_MAC_ADMIN as stdout/stderr, and the setcap binary writes to
> it, then the capable() check is bypassed. (But of course, to open the
> sysctl file in the first place, you'd need to be root (uid 0), so the
> check doesn't really matter.)
I agree with you that a confused deputy attack may uses file
descriptors, but I don't see how the current sysctl API may be used to
check the process capability at open time. Anyway, on a properly
configured system, especially one leveraging Linux capabilities (e.g.
CLIP OS), root processes may not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Moreover, SUID or
fcap binaries may not be available to an attacker (e.g. in a container).
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