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Message-ID: <CAG48ez3_oMX7Nzjaa4=QzipQ7i-BOOVojY5WVBNOBw0RZeik=g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 10:36:02 +0100
From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To: Jason Yan <yanaijie@...wei.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, zhaohongjiang@...wei.com, 
	miaoxie@...wei.com, Li Bin <huawei.libin@...wei.com>, 
	Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] usercopy: skip the check if not a real usercopy

On Wed, Jan 2, 2019 at 12:10 PM Jason Yan <yanaijie@...wei.com> wrote:
> Some kernel codes use copy_to/from_user to copy data between kernel
> buffers by calling set_fs(KERNEL_DS). Hardened usercopy will check these
> objects and sometimes soft lockup may happen as follows:
>
> [   96.314420] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#4 stuck for 22s! [sh:356]
> ......
> [   96.674904] Call Trace:
> [   96.684489]  __check_object_size+0x1f1/0x460
> [   96.691669]  __probe_kernel_write+0x195/0x390
> [   96.696821]  ftrace_write+0x67/0xa0

I think it makes sense to focus on the __probe_kernel_write(), not the
KERNEL_DS.

>
> It's unnecessary to check these objects for copying between kernel buffers.
> So skip all hardened usercopy tests.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@...wei.com>
> CC: Li Bin <huawei.libin@...wei.com>
> CC: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@...wei.com>
> ---
>  mm/usercopy.c | 5 +++++
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
> index 852eb4e53f06..8a0a1854f564 100644
> --- a/mm/usercopy.c
> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
>  #include <linux/atomic.h>
>  #include <linux/jump_label.h>
>  #include <asm/sections.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
>
>  /*
>   * Checks if a given pointer and length is contained by the current
> @@ -255,6 +256,10 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
>         if (static_branch_unlikely(&bypass_usercopy_checks))
>                 return;
>
> +       /* Skip all tests if it is not a real usercopy. */
> +       if (uaccess_kernel())
> +               return;
> +
>         /* Skip all tests if size is zero. */
>         if (!n)
>                 return;

As an alternative, maybe it would make sense to only do this when the
access is coming through __probe_kernel_read() and
__probe_kernel_write()? These functions are specifically for accessing
arbitrary kernel memory, including via things like kcore and kgdb; so
I don't think usercopy restrictions make sense for them. I'm actually
surprised that people haven't complained about this earlier.

I had to do something similar for my "complain on kernel pagefault in
usercopy code" series, by adding the per-task number
"kernel_uaccess_faults_ok" and incrementing/decrementing it in
__probe_kernel_{read,write}; see commit
9da3f2b74054406f87dff7101a569217ffceb29b.

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