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Message-ID: <20181205114148.GA15160@arm.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 11:41:49 +0000
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, jeyu@...nel.org,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
"Dock, Deneen T" <deneen.t.dock@...el.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@...el.com>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
"Naveen N . Rao" <naveen.n.rao@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] vmalloc: New flag for flush before releasing pages
On Tue, Dec 04, 2018 at 12:09:49PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 4, 2018 at 12:02 PM Edgecombe, Rick P
> <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 2018-12-04 at 16:03 +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> > > On Mon, Dec 03, 2018 at 05:43:11PM -0800, Nadav Amit wrote:
> > > > > On Nov 27, 2018, at 4:07 PM, Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > Since vfree will lazily flush the TLB, but not lazily free the underlying
> > > > > pages,
> > > > > it often leaves stale TLB entries to freed pages that could get re-used.
> > > > > This is
> > > > > undesirable for cases where the memory being freed has special permissions
> > > > > such
> > > > > as executable.
> > > >
> > > > So I am trying to finish my patch-set for preventing transient W+X mappings
> > > > from taking space, by handling kprobes & ftrace that I missed (thanks again
> > > > for
> > > > pointing it out).
> > > >
> > > > But all of the sudden, I don’t understand why we have the problem that this
> > > > (your) patch-set deals with at all. We already change the mappings to make
> > > > the memory writable before freeing the memory, so why can’t we make it
> > > > non-executable at the same time? Actually, why do we make the module memory,
> > > > including its data executable before freeing it???
> > >
> > > Yeah, this is really confusing, but I have a suspicion it's a combination
> > > of the various different configurations and hysterical raisins. We can't
> > > rely on module_alloc() allocating from the vmalloc area (see nios2) nor
> > > can we rely on disable_ro_nx() being available at build time.
> > >
> > > If we *could* rely on module allocations always using vmalloc(), then
> > > we could pass in Rick's new flag and drop disable_ro_nx() altogether
> > > afaict -- who cares about the memory attributes of a mapping that's about
> > > to disappear anyway?
> > >
> > > Is it just nios2 that does something different?
> > >
> > Yea it is really intertwined. I think for x86, set_memory_nx everywhere would
> > solve it as well, in fact that was what I first thought the solution should be
> > until this was suggested. It's interesting that from the other thread Masami
> > Hiramatsu referenced, set_memory_nx was suggested last year and would have
> > inadvertently blocked this on x86. But, on the other architectures I have since
> > learned it is a bit different.
> >
> > It looks like actually most arch's don't re-define set_memory_*, and so all of
> > the frob_* functions are actually just noops. In which case allocating RWX is
> > needed to make it work at all, because that is what the allocation is going to
> > stay at. So in these archs, set_memory_nx won't solve it because it will do
> > nothing.
> >
> > On x86 I think you cannot get rid of disable_ro_nx fully because there is the
> > changing of the permissions on the directmap as well. You don't want some other
> > caller getting a page that was left RO when freed and then trying to write to
> > it, if I understand this.
> >
>
> Exactly.
Of course, I forgot about the linear mapping. On arm64, we've just queued
support for reflecting changes to read-only permissions in the linear map
[1]. So, whilst the linear map is always non-executable, we will need to
make parts of it writable again when freeing the module.
> After slightly more thought, I suggest renaming VM_IMMEDIATE_UNMAP to
> VM_MAY_ADJUST_PERMS or similar. It would have the semantics you want,
> but it would also call some arch hooks to put back the direct map
> permissions before the flush. Does that seem reasonable? It would
> need to be hooked up that implement set_memory_ro(), but that should
> be quite easy. If nothing else, it could fall back to set_memory_ro()
> in the absence of a better implementation.
You mean set_memory_rw() here, right? Although, eliding the TLB invalidation
would open up a window where the vmap mapping is executable and the linear
mapping is writable, which is a bit rubbish.
Will
[1]
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git/commit/?h=for-next/core&id=c55191e96caa9d787e8f682c5e525b7f8172a3b4
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