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Message-ID: <CAG48ez0P7dq+j7gy0dbbS8aLOPC-M3rsbNPuHwXHAMh_bfSQgw@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2018 23:42:46 +0200 From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, kristen@...ux.intel.com, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>, kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: entry: flush the cache if syscall error On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 10:56 PM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote: > On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 1:48 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote: > > On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 11:55 AM Kristen Carlson Accardi > > <kristen@...ux.intel.com> wrote: > >> > >> This patch aims to make it harder to perform cache timing attacks on data > >> left behind by system calls. If we have an error returned from a syscall, > >> flush the L1 cache. > >> > >> It's important to note that this patch is not addressing any specific > >> exploit, nor is it intended to be a complete defense against anything. > >> It is intended to be a low cost way of eliminating some of side effects > >> of a failed system call. > >> > >> A performance test using sysbench on one hyperthread and a script which > >> attempts to repeatedly access files it does not have permission to access > >> on the other hyperthread found no significant performance impact. > >> > >> Suggested-by: Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com> > >> Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com> > >> --- > >> arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++ > >> arch/x86/entry/common.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ > >> 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+) > >> > >> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > >> index 1a0be022f91d..bde978eb3b4e 100644 > >> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > >> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > >> @@ -445,6 +445,15 @@ config RETPOLINE > >> code are eliminated. Since this includes the syscall entry path, > >> it is not entirely pointless. > >> > >> +config SYSCALL_FLUSH > >> + bool "Clear L1 Cache on syscall errors" > >> + default n > >> + help > >> + Selecting 'y' allows the L1 cache to be cleared upon return of > >> + an error code from a syscall if the CPU supports "flush_l1d". > >> + This may reduce the likelyhood of speculative execution style > >> + attacks on syscalls. > >> + > >> config INTEL_RDT > >> bool "Intel Resource Director Technology support" > >> default n > >> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c > >> index 3b2490b81918..26de8ea71293 100644 > >> --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c > >> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c > >> @@ -268,6 +268,20 @@ __visible inline void syscall_return_slowpath(struct pt_regs *regs) > >> prepare_exit_to_usermode(regs); > >> } > >> > >> +__visible inline void l1_cache_flush(struct pt_regs *regs) > >> +{ > >> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SYSCALL_FLUSH) && > >> + static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) { > >> + if (regs->ax == 0 || regs->ax == -EAGAIN || > >> + regs->ax == -EEXIST || regs->ax == -ENOENT || > >> + regs->ax == -EXDEV || regs->ax == -ETIMEDOUT || > >> + regs->ax == -ENOTCONN || regs->ax == -EINPROGRESS) > > > > What about ax > 0? (Or more generally, any ax outside the range of -1 > > .. -4095 or whatever the error range is.) As it stands, it looks like > > you'll flush on successful read(), write(), recv(), etc, and that > > could seriously hurt performance on real workloads. > > Seems like just changing this with "ax == 0" into "ax >= 0" would solve that? As spender points out on twitter (https://twitter.com/grsecurity/status/1050497259937370118 - thanks, spender!), struct pt_regs stores register values as "unsigned long", and so you'll need to use something like IS_ERR_VALUE().
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