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Message-Id: <20180815235355.14908-6-casey.schaufler@intel.com> Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 16:53:55 -0700 From: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com> To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, SMACK-discuss@...ts.01.org, casey.schaufler@...el.com, dave.hansen@...el.com, deneen.t.dock@...el.com, kristen@...ux.intel.com, arjan@...ux.intel.com Subject: [PATCH RFC 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux determination of side-channel vulnerability SELinux considers tasks to be side-channel safe if they have PROCESS_SHARE access. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com> --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a8bf324130f5..7fbd7d7ac1cb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4219,6 +4219,14 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } +static int selinux_task_safe_sidechannel(struct task_struct *p) +{ + struct av_decision avd; + + return avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), + SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, 0, &avd); +} + /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) @@ -7002,6 +7010,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_safe_sidechannel, selinux_task_safe_sidechannel), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid), -- 2.17.1
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