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Message-Id: <1534457824-7211-7-git-send-email-alex.popov@linux.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Aug 2018 01:17:03 +0300
From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
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Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@....com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
"Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>,
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x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
alex.popov@...ux.com
Subject: [PATCH v15 6/7] stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing
Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE option, which provides
'stack_erasing' sysctl. It can be used in runtime to control kernel
stack erasing for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
---
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/stackleak.h | 6 ++++++
kernel/stackleak.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/sysctl.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++
5 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index eded671d..1feae79 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
- shmmni
- softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace
- soft_watchdog
+- stack_erasing
- stop-a [ SPARC only ]
- sysrq ==> Documentation/admin-guide/sysrq.rst
- sysctl_writes_strict
@@ -962,6 +963,23 @@ detect a hard lockup condition.
==============================================================
+stack_erasing
+
+This parameter can be used to control kernel stack erasing at the end
+of syscalls for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
+
+That erasing reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs
+can reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
+The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel
+compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary.
+
+ 0: kernel stack erasing is disabled, STACKLEAK_METRICS are not updated.
+
+ 1: kernel stack erasing is enabled (default), it is performed before
+ returning to the userspace at the end of syscalls.
+
+==============================================================
+
tainted:
Non-zero if the kernel has been tainted. Numeric values, which can be
diff --git a/include/linux/stackleak.h b/include/linux/stackleak.h
index b911b97..3d5c327 100644
--- a/include/linux/stackleak.h
+++ b/include/linux/stackleak.h
@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ static inline void stackleak_task_init(struct task_struct *t)
t->prev_lowest_stack = t->lowest_stack;
# endif
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
+int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+#endif
+
#else /* !CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK */
static inline void stackleak_task_init(struct task_struct *t) { }
#endif
diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/stackleak.c
index f662395..e428929 100644
--- a/kernel/stackleak.c
+++ b/kernel/stackleak.c
@@ -12,6 +12,41 @@
#include <linux/stackleak.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass);
+
+int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass);
+ int prev_state = state;
+
+ table->data = &state;
+ table->maxlen = sizeof(int);
+ ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ state = !!state;
+ if (ret || !write || state == prev_state)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (state)
+ static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
+ else
+ static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
+
+ pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n",
+ state ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#define skip_erasing() static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass)
+#else
+#define skip_erasing() false
+#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
+
asmlinkage void stackleak_erase(void)
{
/* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
@@ -20,6 +55,9 @@ asmlinkage void stackleak_erase(void)
unsigned int poison_count = 0;
const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
+ if (skip_erasing())
+ return;
+
/* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */
if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE))
kstack_ptr = boundary;
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index f22f76b..faa216d 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -91,7 +91,9 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_CHR_DEV_SG
#include <scsi/sg.h>
#endif
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
+#include <linux/stackleak.h>
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
#include <linux/nmi.h>
#endif
@@ -1222,6 +1224,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.extra2 = &one,
},
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
+ {
+ .procname = "stack_erasing",
+ .data = NULL,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0600,
+ .proc_handler = stack_erasing_sysctl,
+ .extra1 = &zero,
+ .extra2 = &one,
+ },
+#endif
{ }
};
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
index f15093b..8b01c8e 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
@@ -182,4 +182,12 @@ config STACKLEAK_METRICS
can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
your workloads.
+config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
+ bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
+ depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+ help
+ This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
+ runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
+ CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
+
endif
--
2.7.4
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