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Message-ID: <CAJHCu1+S_tv8Ju4m_QuWPm5Ke6rmByxT7jVhSo2kfVoCO_wMFg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 18:11:38 +0200
From: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] kconfig: add hardened defconfig helpers
I'm sorry for the late response, I've been unexpectedly busy in the last week.
2018-07-20 7:15 GMT+02:00 Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>:
> +lkml, Masahiro, and linux-doc, just for wider review/thoughts.
>
> On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 10:38 AM, Salvatore Mesoraca
> <s.mesoraca16@...il.com> wrote:
>> Adds 4 new defconfig helpers (hardenedlowconfig,
>> hardenedmediumconfig, hardenedhighconfig,
>> hardenedextremeconfig) to enable various hardening
>> features.
>> The list of config options to enable is based on
>> KSPP's Recommended Settings[1] and on
>> kconfig-hardened-check[2], with some modifications.
>> These options are divided into 4 levels (low, medium,
>> high, extreme) based on their negative side effects, not
>> on their usefulness.
>> 'Low' level collects all those protections that have
>> (almost) no negative side effects.
>
> Likely the "Low" should be on-by-default already, but it's easier to
> bike-shed that separately. :)
>
>> 'Extreme' level collects those protections that may have
>> some many negative side effects that most people
>> wouldn't want to enable them.
>> Every feature in each level is briefly documented in
>> Documentation/security/hardenedconfig.rst, this file
>> also contain a better explanation of what every level
>> means.
>> To prevent this file from drifting from what the various
>> defconfigs actually do, it is used to dynamically
>> generate the config fragments.
>
> I like that the configs are generated from the docs! This makes things
> very sane to update.
>
>>
>> [1] http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings
>> [2] https://github.com/a13xp0p0v/kconfig-hardened-check
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>
>> ---
>> .gitignore | 6 +
>> Documentation/security/hardenedconfig.rst | 1027 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 +
>> Makefile | 6 +-
>> scripts/kconfig/Makefile | 72 +-
>> scripts/kconfig/build_hardened_fragment.sh | 54 ++
>> 6 files changed, 1143 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 Documentation/security/hardenedconfig.rst
>> create mode 100755 scripts/kconfig/build_hardened_fragment.sh
>>
>> diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
>> index 97ba6b7..9141f85 100644
>> --- a/.gitignore
>> +++ b/.gitignore
>> @@ -132,3 +132,9 @@ all.config
>>
>> # Kdevelop4
>> *.kdev4
>> +
>> +# Generated config fragments
>> +kernel/configs/hardenedlow.config
>> +kernel/configs/hardenedmedium.config
>> +kernel/configs/hardenedhigh.config
>> +kernel/configs/hardenedextreme.config
>
> I wonder if there should be an explicit "generated/" subdirectory in
> kernel/configs/ ?
Yes, that woud probably be better.
>> diff --git a/Documentation/security/hardenedconfig.rst b/Documentation/security/hardenedconfig.rst
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..04ae0d9
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/Documentation/security/hardenedconfig.rst
>
> And thank you for doing this in .rst!
>
>> @@ -0,0 +1,1027 @@
>> +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +
>> +===============================
>> +Hardening Configuration Options
>> +===============================
>> +
>> +This is a list of configuration options that are useful for hardening purposes.
>> +These options are divided in 4 levels based on the magnitude of their negative
>> +side effects, not on their importance or usefulness:
>> +
>> + - **Low**: Negligible performance impact. No user-space breakage.
>> + - **Medium**: Some performance impact and/or user-space breakage for
>> + few users.
>> + - **High**: Notable performance impact and/or user-space breakage for
>> + many users.
>> + - **Extreme**: Big performance impact and/or user-space breakage for
>> + most users.
>> +
>> +In other words: **Low** level contains protections that *everybody* can and
>> +should use; **Medium** level should be usable by *most people* without issues;
>> +**High** level may cause *some trouble*, especially from a *performance*
>> +perspective; **Extreme** level contains protections that *few people* may want
>> +to enable, some people will probably *cherry-pick* some options from here based
>> +on their needs.
>> +
>> +For further details about which option is included in each level, please read
>> +the description below, for more information on any particular option refer to
>> +their help page.
>> +
>> +The content of this list is automatically translated into *config fragments*
>> +that can be used to apply the suggested hardening options to your current
>> +configuration.
>> +To use them you just need to run ``make hardened$LEVELconfig`` (e.g.
>> +``make hardenedhighconfig``).
>> +
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>
> Rather than "self-protection", this is really about blocking direct
> kernel memory writing from userspace. Maybe "Kernel memory integrity"?
OK. I'll change it.
>> +
>> +This debug facility allows ACPI AML methods to be inserted and/or replaced
>> +without rebooting the system.
>> +This option is security sensitive, because it allows arbitrary kernel
>> +memory to be written to by root (uid=0) users, allowing them to bypass
>> +certain security measures (e.g. if root is not allowed to load additional
>> +kernel modules after boot, this feature may be used to override that
>> +restriction).
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_BPF_JIT=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>> +**- Protection type:** Attack surface reduction
>
> This maybe should be clarified to "Kernel attack surface reduction"?
OK. I'll change it.
>> +
>> +Berkeley Packet Filter filtering capabilities are normally handled
>> +by an interpreter. This option allows kernel to generate a native
>> +code when filter is loaded in memory. This should speedup
>> +packet sniffing (libpcap/tcpdump).
>> +
>> +Note, admin should enable this feature changing:
>> +/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable
>> +/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden (optional)
>> +/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_kallsyms (optional)
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Extreme
>> +**- Protection type:** Attack surface reduction
>
> Same.
OK. I'll change it.
>> +
>> +Enable the bpf() system call that allows to manipulate eBPF
>> +programs and maps via file descriptors.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_BUG=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>
> This was a left-over mistaken prerequisite for hardened-usercopy.
> Without CONFIG_BUG, things will still stop kernel thread execution.
> It's just much less pretty. :P Perhaps, if kept, this should be listed
> as "Improved crash analysis" or "prerequisite"?
Ah, I wasn't sure about the reason why CONFIG_BUG was needed.
If it's just about error reporting I'll drop it.
>> +
>> +Report BUG() conditions and kill the offending process.
>> +There are very few cases in which this won't be desirable.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters
>> +data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked
>> +for validity.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>
> "probabilistic kernel stack buffer overflow detection"?
>
> There are a lot of "buffer overflow detection" things, so naming which
> is which seems helpful, but is maybe overkill? "Self-protection" or
> "kernel memory integrity" covers it too... hmmm
I don't know, maybe we should leave the "Protection type" field as
simple as possible and then use the description to make things
clearer.
But I'm not against changing it...
>> +
>> +Turns on the "stack-protector" GCC feature. This feature puts,
>> +at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
>> +the stack just before the return address, and validates
>> +the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer
>> +overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
>> +overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
>> +neutralized via a kernel panic.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Functions will have the stack-protector canary logic added in any
>> +of the following conditions:
>> +
>> +- local variable's address used as part of the right hand side of an
>> +assignment or function argument
>> +- local variable is an array (or union containing an array),
>> +regardless of array type or length
>> +- uses register local variables
>> +
>> +This feature requires gcc version 4.9 or above, or a distribution
>> +gcc with the feature backported ("-fstack-protector-strong").
>> +
>> +On an x86 "defconfig" build, this feature adds canary checks to
>> +about 20% of all kernel functions, which increases the kernel code
>> +size by about 2%.
>
> bikeshed: I think both stack protector items should be "Low", but
> that's just me.
I tried to be cautious when selecting the levels, but if nobody is
against it, I can change the level.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>
> This is a userspace defense. "Userspace brk ASLR"?
Ops... my bad
>> +
>> +Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it
>> +also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based).
>> +This option changes the bootup default to heap randomization
>> +disabled, and can be overridden at runtime by setting
>> +/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space to 2.
>> +
>> +On non-ancient distros (post-2000 ones) N is usually a safe choice.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** User space protection
>> +
>> +
>> +Map the VDSO to the predictable old-style address too.
>> +Glibc 2.3.3 is the only version that needs it, but
>> +OpenSUSE 9 contains a buggy "glibc 2.3.2".
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Turn on some debug checking for credential management.
>> +These structs are often abused by attackers.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>
> bikeshed: Low
Same as with stackprotector.
>
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Turn on extended checks in the linked-list walking routines.
>> +These structs are often abused by attackers.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Turn on sanity checking for notifier call chains.
>> +These structs are often abused by attackers.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Turn on checks on scatter-gather tables.
>> +These structs could be abused by attackers.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_DEBUG_WX=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
>> +This is useful for discovering cases where the kernel is leaving W+X
>> +mappings after applying NX, as such mappings are a security risk.
>> +There is no runtime or memory usage effect of this option once the
>> +kernel has booted up - it's a one time check.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536
>
> This is, unfortunately, architecture-specific. I'm not sure the best
> way to deal with that with the make target...
Ah, you are right... If I won't find any reasonable way to set this
option to the correcte value on every arch I'll drop it.
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
>> +from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
>> +can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
>> +
>> +This value can be changed after boot using the
>> +/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_DEVKMEM=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +The /dev/kmem device can be used by root to access kernel virtual memory.
>> +It is rarely used, but can be used for certain kind of kernel debugging
>> +operations.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_DEVMEM=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Extreme
>
> Why is this extreme?
I tried to be very cautious and I had the impression that this option
could break many programs,
isn't Xorg one of these?
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +The /dev/mem device is used to access areas of physical
>> +memory.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
>> +where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_FTRACE=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Extreme
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>
> bikeshed: Kernel attack surface reduction
Agreed
>> +
>> +Enable the kernel tracing infrastructure.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>
> "prerequisite"
Agreed
>> +
>> +GCC plugins are loadable modules that provide extra features to the
>> +compiler. They are useful for runtime instrumentation and static analysis.
>> +
>> +See Documentation/gcc-plugins.txt for details.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +With this pluging, the kernel will instrument some kernel code to
>> +extract some entropy from both original and artificially created
>> +program state. This will help especially embedded systems where
>> +there is little 'natural' source of entropy normally. The cost
>> +is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and
>
> This doesn't feel like "high" to me.
Medium maybe?
>> +irq processing.
>> +Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically
>> +secure!
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>
> This should surely be High or Extreme. It creates (nondeterministic)
> performance impact and makes crashes undebuggable.
Agreed.
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +With this pluging, the layouts of structures that are entirely
>> +function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with
>> +__no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly
>> +marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time.
>> +This can introduce the requirement of an additional information
>> +exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure
>> +types.
>> +Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact,
>> +slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic
>> +tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel
>> +source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation).
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>
> bikeshed: Low
Agreed.
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +This plugin zero-initializes any structures containing a
>> +__user attribute. This can prevent some classes of information
>> +exposures.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Zero initialize any struct type local variable that may be passed by
>> +reference without having been initialized.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>
> bikeshed: Low (all distros have this enabled already)
Agreed.
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
>> +copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
>> +copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
>> +are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
>> +separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
>> +or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
>> +of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>> +**- Protection type:** None / Aesthetical
>
> This is still self-protection (or "kernel memory integrity"). I would
> classify this as Low, but I could see an argument for Medium if
> someone trips over a missing whitelist.
Oh, right! I'll go for Medium, to be conservative.
>> +
>> +This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists
>> +to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of
>> +rejecting the copy, falling back to non-whitelisted hardened
>> +usercopy that checks the slab allocation size instead of the
>> +whitelist size. This option will be removed once it seems like
>> +all missing usercopy whitelists have been identified and fixed.
>> +Booting with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=Y/N" can change
>> +this setting.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_HIBERNATION=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Extreme
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Enabling suspend to disk (STD) functionality (hibernation)
>> +allows replacement of running kernel.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Extreme
>> +**- Protection type:** Attack surface reduction
>> +
>> +Include code to run legacy 32-bit programs under a 64-bit kernel.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_INET_DIAG=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Extreme
>> +**- Protection type:** Attack surface reduction
>> +
>> +Support for INET (TCP, DCCP, etc) socket monitoring interface used by
>> +native Linux tools such as ss. ss is included in iproute2.
>> +In the past, this was used to help heap memory attacks.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>
> bikeshed: Low (distros enable this already)
Agreed.
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access to
>> +all io-memory regardless of whether a driver is actively using that
>> +range. Accidental access to this is obviously disastrous, but
>> +specific access can be used by people debugging kernel drivers.
>> +If this option is switched on, the /dev/mem file only allows
>> +userspace access to *idle* io-memory ranges (see /proc/iomem)
>> +This may break traditional users of /dev/mem (dosemu, legacy X, etc...)
>> +if the driver using a given range cannot be disabled.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_KEXEC=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** Attack surface reduction
>> +
>> +kexec is a system call that implements the ability to shutdown your
>> +current kernel, and to start another kernel.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** Attack surface reduction
>> +
>> +Enable the kexec file based system call. In contrast to the normal
>> +kexec system call this system call takes file descriptors for the
>> +kernel and initramfs as arguments.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_KPROBES=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Kprobes allows you to trap at almost any kernel address and
>> +execute a callback function.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** User space protection
>> +
>> +Linux has traditionally used the BSD-like names /dev/ptyxx
>> +for masters and /dev/ttyxx for slaves of pseudo
>> +terminals. This scheme has a number of problems, including
>> +security. This option enables these legacy devices.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>
> A rapidly diminishing argument could be made for Medium here.
OK.
>> +**- Protection type:** User space protection
>> +
>> +There will be no vsyscall mapping at all. This will
>> +eliminate any risk of ASLR bypass due to the vsyscall
>> +fixed address mapping. Attempts to use the vsyscalls
>> +will be reported to dmesg, so that either old or
>> +malicious userspace programs can be identified.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_LIVEPATCH=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Extreme
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Kernel live patching support allows root to modify the running
>> +kernel. This is mainly used to apply security updates without
>> +rebooting, but it might be abused.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_EXPERT=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** None
>
> "prerequisite"?
OK.
>> +
>> +Needed to change CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** Attack surface reduction
>> +
>> +Linux can allow user programs to install a per-process x86
>> +Local Descriptor Table (LDT) using the modify_ldt(2) system
>> +call. This is required to run 16-bit or segmented code such as
>> +DOSEMU or some Wine programs. It is also used by some very old
>> +threading libraries.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_MODULES=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Extreme
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Kernel modules are small pieces of compiled code which can
>> +be inserted in the running kernel, rather than being
>> +permanently built into the kernel.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
>> +is simply appended to the module.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Sign all modules during make modules_install. Without this option,
>> +modules must be signed manually, using the scripts/sign-file tool.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
>> +key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
>> +key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH="sha512"
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +This determines which sort of hashing algorithm will be used during
>> +signature generation.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +This determines which sort of hashing algorithm will be used during
>> +signature generation.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Fill the pages with poison patterns after free_pages() and verify
>> +the patterns before alloc_pages. The filling of the memory helps
>> +reduce the risk of information leaks from freed data. This does
>> +have a potential performance impact.
>> +Needs "page_poison=1" command line.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Skip the sanity checking on alloc, only fill the pages with
>> +poison on free. This reduces some of the overhead of the
>> +poisoning feature.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Extreme
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Skip the sanity checking on alloc, only fill the pages with
>> +poison on free. This reduces some of the overhead of the
>> +poisoning feature.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Instead of using the existing poison value, fill the pages with
>> +zeros. This makes it harder to detect when errors are occurring
>> +due to sanitization but the zeroing at free means that it is
>> +no longer necessary to write zeros when GFP_ZERO is used on
>> +allocation.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>
> Oof. This needs to always be on... but it does have a high cost.
Yes :(
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
>> +ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
>> +into userspace.
>> +
>> +See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Extreme
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Say Y here to enable the kernel to panic when it oopses. This
>> +has the same effect as setting oops=panic on the kernel command
>> +line.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT=-1
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Extreme
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Set the timeout value (in seconds) until a reboot occurs when the
>> +the kernel panics. If n = 0, then we wait forever. A timeout
>> +value n > 0 will wait n seconds before rebooting, while a timeout
>> +value n < 0 will reboot immediately.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_PROC_KCORE=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Provides a virtual ELF core file of the live kernel. This can
>> +be read with gdb and other ELF tools, exposing kernel layout.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_PROFILING=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Extreme
>> +**- Protection type:** Attack surface reduction
>> +
>> +Enable the extended profiling support mechanisms used
>> +by profilers such as OProfile.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Randomizes the physical and virtual address at which the
>> +kernel image is loaded, as a security feature that
>> +deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location
>> +of kernel internals.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Randomizes the base virtual address of kernel memory sections
>> +(physical memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap). This security feature
>> +makes exploits relying on predictable memory locations less reliable.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>
> I'd put this Medium. Though some architectures use this by default (arm64, arm).
Agreed.
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast
>> +unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked
>> +implementation, which can be (slightly) slower but provides protections
>> +against various use-after-free conditions that can be used in
>> +security flaw exploits.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against
>> +kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect
>> +branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
>> +support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
>> +
>> +Without compiler support, at least indirect branches in assembler
>> +code are eliminated. Since this includes the syscall entry path,
>> +it is not entirely pointless.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +This option checks for a stack overrun on calls to schedule().
>> +If the stack end location is found to be over written always panic as
>> +the content of the corrupted region can no longer be trusted.
>> +This is to ensure no erroneous behaviour occurs which could result in
>> +data corruption or a sporadic crash at a later stage once the region
>> +is examined. The runtime overhead introduced is minimal.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_SECCOMP=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** User space protection / Attack surface reduction
>> +
>> +This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
>> +that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
>> +execution.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** User space protection / Attack surface reduction
>> +
>> +Enable tasks to build secure computing environments defined
>> +in terms of Berkeley Packet Filter programs which implement
>> +task-defined system call filtering polices.
>> +
>> +See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_SECURITY=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Generic
>> +
>> +This allows you to choose different security modules to be
>> +configured into your kernel.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
>> +syslog via dmesg(8).
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Generic
>> +
>> +This option enables writing to a selinuxfs node 'disable', which
>> +allows SELinux to be disabled at runtime prior to the policy load.
>> +SELinux will then remain disabled until the next boot.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** User space protection
>> +
>> +This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
>> +system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
>> +access controls. Currently available is ptrace scope restriction.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>
> I think this is Low.
Agreed.
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and
>> +other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance
>> +sacrifies to harden the kernel slab allocator against common
>> +freelist exploit methods.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>
> Low
OK
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This
>> +security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab
>> +allocator against heap overflows.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>
> This should be Low, since it doesn't actually do anything until you
> enable features on the cmdline.
Ah, right.
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Enalbe SLUB debug support features.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Boot with debugging on by default. SLUB debugging may be switched
>> +off in a kernel built with CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON by specifying
>> +"slub_debug=-".
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Extreme
>
> I mean, this SHOULD be Low but no distro has actually implemented a
> helper to do this yet.
Infact I set it as extreme because I expect very few people to make an
use of it.
Maybe I could just drop it.
>> +**- Protection type:** Attack surface reduction
>> +
>> +By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
>> +binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
>> +interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined
>> +either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
>> +option. However, some of these are dynamically created at
>> +runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
>> +To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
>> +calls through a single executable that can not have its name
>> +changed.
>> +
>> +Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
>> +"real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
>> +passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick
>> +and choose what real programs are called.
>> +
>> +If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
>> +disabled, choose this option and then set
>> +STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
>
> I feel like this should be near IO_DEVMEM and DEVMEM
I put them in alphabetical order for my convenience, but I understand
why you want them together.
Agreed.
>
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access
>> +to all of memory, including kernel and userspace memory.
>> +Accidental access to this is obviously disastrous, but specific
>> +access can be used by people debugging the kernel.
>> +If this option is switched on, the /dev/mem file only allows
>> +userspace access to memory mapped peripherals.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Kernel text and rodata memory will be made read-only, and non-text memory will
>> +be made non-executable. This provides protection against certain security
>> +exploits (e.g. executing the heap or modifying text).
>> +These features are considered standard security practice these days.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +If this is set, module text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
>> +and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
>> +protection against certain security exploits (e.g. writing to text)
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** User space protection
>> +
>> +Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN flooding".
>> +This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote users from being
>> +able to connect to your computer during an ongoing attack and requires very
>> +little work from the attacker, who can operate from anywhere on the Internet.
>> +SYN cookies provide protection against this type of attack.
>> +SYN cookies may prevent correct error reporting on clients when the server is
>> +really overloaded. If this happens frequently better turn them off.
>> +Note that SYN cookies aren't enabled by default; you can enable them by saying
>> +Y to "/proc file system support" and "Sysctl support" below and executing the
>> +command:
>> +
>> +echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies
>> +
>> +at boot time after the /proc file system has been mounted.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Move thread_info off the stack into task_struct.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_UPROBES=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** High
>> +**- Protection type:** User space protection
>> +
>> +Uprobes is the user-space counterpart to kprobes: they
>> +enable instrumentation applications (such as 'perf probe')
>> +to establish unintrusive probes in user-space binaries and
>> +libraries, by executing handler functions when the probes
>> +are hit by user-space applications.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_USER_NS=n
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>
> Unfortunately I think this is High or Extreme. USER_NS gets a lot of use.
Yes, you are right.
>> +**- Protection type:** Attack surface reduction
>> +
>> +This allows containers to use user namespaces to provide different
>> +user info for different servers.
>> +User namespaces have been abused in the past for privilege
>> +escalation.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Low
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Enable this if you want the use virtually-mapped kernel stacks
>> +with guard pages. This causes kernel stack overflows to be
>> +caught immediately rather than causing difficult-to-diagnose
>> +corruption.
>> +This is presently incompatible with KASAN.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_X86_SMAP=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>
> This is Low.
OK
>> +**- Protection type:** Self-protection
>> +
>> +Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is a security feature in newer
>> +Intel processors. There is a small performance cost if this enabled and
>> +turned on; there is also a small increase in the kernel size if this is
>> +enabled.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>> +**- Protection type:** User space protection
>
> No idea what to do with this one. Support is being removed, etc.
>
>> +
>> +MPX provides hardware features that can be used in conjunction with
>> +compiler-instrumented code to check memory references. It is designed
>> +to detect buffer overflow or underflow bugs.
>> +This option enables running applications which are instrumented or
>> +otherwise use MPX. It does not use MPX itself inside the kernel or to
>> +protect the kernel against bad memory references.
>> +
>> +
>> +CONFIG_X86_INTEL_UMIP=y
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +**Negative side effects level:** Medium
>
> Low?
OK
>> +**- Protection type:** Information leak prevention
>> +
>> +The User Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP) is a security feature in newer
>> +Intel processors. If enabled, a general protection fault is issued if the
>> +SGDT, SLDT, SIDT, SMSW or STR instructions are executed in user mode.
>> +These instructions unnecessarily expose information about the hardware state.
>> +The vast majority of applications do not use these instructions. For the very
>> +few that do, software emulation is provided in specific cases in protected and
>> +virtual-8086 modes. Emulated results are dummy.
>> diff --git a/Documentation/security/index.rst b/Documentation/security/index.rst
>> index 85492bf..01b8265 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/security/index.rst
>> +++ b/Documentation/security/index.rst
>> @@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ Security Documentation
>> SELinux-sctp
>> self-protection
>> tpm/index
>> + hardenedconfig
>> diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
>> index a89d8a0..e967504 100644
>> --- a/Makefile
>> +++ b/Makefile
>> @@ -1282,7 +1282,11 @@ MRPROPER_FILES += .config .config.old .version \
>> Module.symvers tags TAGS cscope* GPATH GTAGS GRTAGS GSYMS \
>> signing_key.pem signing_key.priv signing_key.x509 \
>> x509.genkey extra_certificates signing_key.x509.keyid \
>> - signing_key.x509.signer vmlinux-gdb.py
>> + signing_key.x509.signer vmlinux-gdb.py \
>> + kernel/configs/hardenedlow.config \
>> + kernel/configs/hardenedmedium.config \
>> + kernel/configs/hardenedhigh.config \
>> + kernel/configs/hardenedextreme.config
>>
>> # clean - Delete most, but leave enough to build external modules
>> #
>> diff --git a/scripts/kconfig/Makefile b/scripts/kconfig/Makefile
>> index a3ac2c9..b5ebb13 100644
>> --- a/scripts/kconfig/Makefile
>> +++ b/scripts/kconfig/Makefile
>> @@ -100,6 +100,16 @@ endif
>>
>> configfiles=$(wildcard $(srctree)/kernel/configs/$@ $(srctree)/arch/$(SRCARCH)/configs/$@)
>>
>> +hardened%.config:
>> + $(srctree)/scripts/kconfig/build_hardened_fragment.sh \
>
> I think this needs explicit execution (as you do a few lines later) with:
>
> $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/scripts/kconfig/build_hardened_fragment.sh \
> ...
>
> since the execute bit regularly gets lost in vcs, bundles, etc.
Ah yes, thank you.
>
>> + $* $(srctree)/Documentation/security/hardenedconfig.rst > \
>> + $(srctree)/kernel/configs/hardened$*.config
>> + $(eval configfiles += $(srctree)/kernel/configs/hardened$*.config)
>> +
>> + $(if $(call configfiles),, $(error No configuration exists for this target on this architecture))
>> + $(Q)$(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -m .config $(configfiles)
>> + +$(Q)yes "" | $(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile oldconfig
>> +
>> %.config: $(obj)/conf
>> $(if $(call configfiles),, $(error No configuration exists for this target on this architecture))
>> $(Q)$(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -m .config $(configfiles)
>> @@ -117,6 +127,16 @@ PHONY += tinyconfig
>> tinyconfig:
>> $(Q)$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile allnoconfig tiny.config
>>
>> +PHONY += hardenedlowconfig hardenedmediumconfig hardenedhighconfig hardenedextremeconfig
>> +hardenedlowconfig: hardenedlow.config
>> + @:
>> +hardenedmediumconfig: hardenedmedium.config
>> + @:
>> +hardenedhighconfig: hardenedhigh.config
>> + @:
>> +hardenedextremeconfig: hardenedextreme.config
>> + @:
>> +
>> # CHECK: -o cache_dir=<path> working?
>> PHONY += testconfig
>> testconfig: $(obj)/conf
>> @@ -127,28 +147,36 @@ clean-dirs += tests/.cache
>>
>> # Help text used by make help
>> help:
>> - @echo ' config - Update current config utilising a line-oriented program'
>> - @echo ' nconfig - Update current config utilising a ncurses menu based program'
>> - @echo ' menuconfig - Update current config utilising a menu based program'
>> - @echo ' xconfig - Update current config utilising a Qt based front-end'
>> - @echo ' gconfig - Update current config utilising a GTK+ based front-end'
>> - @echo ' oldconfig - Update current config utilising a provided .config as base'
>> - @echo ' localmodconfig - Update current config disabling modules not loaded'
>> - @echo ' localyesconfig - Update current config converting local mods to core'
>> - @echo ' defconfig - New config with default from ARCH supplied defconfig'
>> - @echo ' savedefconfig - Save current config as ./defconfig (minimal config)'
>> - @echo ' allnoconfig - New config where all options are answered with no'
>> - @echo ' allyesconfig - New config where all options are accepted with yes'
>> - @echo ' allmodconfig - New config selecting modules when possible'
>> - @echo ' alldefconfig - New config with all symbols set to default'
>> - @echo ' randconfig - New config with random answer to all options'
>> - @echo ' listnewconfig - List new options'
>> - @echo ' olddefconfig - Same as oldconfig but sets new symbols to their'
>> - @echo ' default value without prompting'
>> - @echo ' kvmconfig - Enable additional options for kvm guest kernel support'
>> - @echo ' xenconfig - Enable additional options for xen dom0 and guest kernel support'
>> - @echo ' tinyconfig - Configure the tiniest possible kernel'
>> - @echo ' testconfig - Run Kconfig unit tests (requires python3 and pytest)'
>
> Can these whitespace changes be avoided?
Yes, well I like the result more, but maybe it makes less obvious what
I'm changing.
>> + @echo ' config - Update current config utilising a line-oriented program'
>> + @echo ' nconfig - Update current config utilising a ncurses menu based program'
>> + @echo ' menuconfig - Update current config utilising a menu based program'
>> + @echo ' xconfig - Update current config utilising a Qt based front-end'
>> + @echo ' gconfig - Update current config utilising a GTK+ based front-end'
>> + @echo ' oldconfig - Update current config utilising a provided .config as base'
>> + @echo ' localmodconfig - Update current config disabling modules not loaded'
>> + @echo ' localyesconfig - Update current config converting local mods to core'
>> + @echo ' defconfig - New config with default from ARCH supplied defconfig'
>> + @echo ' savedefconfig - Save current config as ./defconfig (minimal config)'
>> + @echo ' allnoconfig - New config where all options are answered with no'
>> + @echo ' allyesconfig - New config where all options are accepted with yes'
>> + @echo ' allmodconfig - New config selecting modules when possible'
>> + @echo ' alldefconfig - New config with all symbols set to default'
>> + @echo ' randconfig - New config with random answer to all options'
>> + @echo ' listnewconfig - List new options'
>> + @echo ' olddefconfig - Same as oldconfig but sets new symbols to their'
>> + @echo ' default value without prompting'
>> + @echo ' kvmconfig - Enable additional options for kvm guest kernel support'
>> + @echo ' xenconfig - Enable additional options for xen dom0 and guest kernel support'
>> + @echo ' tinyconfig - Configure the tiniest possible kernel'
>> + @echo ' testconfig - Run Kconfig unit tests (requires python3 and pytest)'
>> + @echo ' hardenedlowconfig - Update current config using hardened features with'
>> + @echo ' few negative side effects'
>> + @echo ' hardenedmediumconfig - Update current config using hardened features with'
>> + @echo ' some negative side effects'
>> + @echo ' hardenedhighconfig - Update current config using hardened features with'
>> + @echo ' many negative side effects'
>> + @echo ' hardenedextremeconfig - Update current config using hardened features with'
>> + @echo ' even more negative side effects'
>>
>> # ===========================================================================
>> # Shared Makefile for the various kconfig executables:
>> diff --git a/scripts/kconfig/build_hardened_fragment.sh b/scripts/kconfig/build_hardened_fragment.sh
>> new file mode 100755
>> index 0000000..92c589a
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/scripts/kconfig/build_hardened_fragment.sh
>> @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
>> +#!/bin/sh
>> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +#
>> +# build_hardened_fragment.sh - Generate a config fragment from an .rst
>> +# file for the specified level.
>> +#
>> +# Copyright 2018 Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>
>> +#
>> +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
>> +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
>> +# published by the Free Software Foundation.
>> +#
>> +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
>> +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
>> +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
>> +# See the GNU General Public License for more details.
>> +
>> +usage() {
>> + echo "Usage: $0 <level> <file.rst>"
>> + echo "Level must be one of: low, medium, high, extreme."
>
> I would send these to stderr: >&2
Agreed.
>> + exit 1
>> +}
>> +
>> +if [ "$#" -ne 2 ]; then
>> + usage
>> +fi
>> +
>> +LEVEL="$(echo $1 | tr [A-Z] [a-z])"
>> +INPUT="$2"
>> +
>> +if [ "$LEVEL" != "low" ] && \
>> + [ "$LEVEL" != "medium" ] && \
>> + [ "$LEVEL" != "high" ] && \
>> + [ "$LEVEL" != "extreme" ]; then
>> + usage
>> +fi
>> +
>> +if ! [ -f "$INPUT" ]; then
>> + usage
>> +fi
>> +
>> +if [ "$LEVEL" = "medium" ]; then
>> + LEVEL="(low|medium)"
>> +elif [ "$LEVEL" = "high" ]; then
>> + LEVEL="(low|medium|high)"
>> +elif [ "$LEVEL" = "extreme" ]; then
>> + LEVEL="(low|medium|high|extreme)"
>> +fi
>> +
>> +egrep -B3 -i "^\*\*Negative side effects level:\*\* $LEVEL$" "$INPUT" | \
>> +grep "^CONFIG_" | \
>> +sed 's/^\(.*\)=[nN]/# \1 is not set/'
>> +
>> +exit 0
>> --
>> 1.9.1
>>
>
> Cool! I think being able to point into this document from the
> self-protection.rst will be nice.
Thank you very very much for taking the time to look at this very long patch!
Salvatore
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