[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <26f2e29b-c016-7140-4fea-853fbbd01459@infradead.org>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 18:07:59 -0700
From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
To: Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, rkrcmar@...hat.com,
nathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, hpa@...or.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Ard Biesheuvel
<ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>,
David Vrabel <david.vrabel@...anix.com>, nigel.edwards@....com,
Rik van Riel <riel@...riel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE
On 07/19/2018 02:38 PM, Ahmed Abd El Mawgood wrote:
> This patch introduces a hypercall implemented for X86 that can assist
> against subset of kernel rootkits, it works by place readonly protection in
> shadow PTE. The end result protection is also kept in a bitmap for each
> kvm_memory_slot and is used as reference when updating SPTEs. The whole
> goal is to protect the guest kernel static data from modification if
> attacker is running from guest ring 0, for this reason there is no
> hypercall to revert effect of Memory ROE hypercall. This patch doesn't
> implement integrity check on guest TLB so obvious attack on the current
> implementation will involve guest virtual address -> guest physical
> address remapping, but there are plans to fix that.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> index 92fd433c50b9..8ae822a8dc7a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> @@ -96,6 +96,13 @@ config KVM_MMU_AUDIT
> This option adds a R/W kVM module parameter 'mmu_audit', which allows
> auditing of KVM MMU events at runtime.
>
> +config KVM_MROE
> + bool "Hypercall Memory Read-Only Enforcement"
> + depends on KVM && X86
> + help
> + This option add KVM_HC_HMROE hypercall to kvm which as hardening
adds to kvm as a hardening (???)
> + mechanism to protect memory pages from being edited.
> +
> # OK, it's a little counter-intuitive to do this, but it puts it neatly under
> # the virtualization menu.
> source drivers/vhost/Kconfig
--
~Randy
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
