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Message-ID: <7e673919-4c6a-0120-a198-a0ed4ee47b36@linux.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2018 20:48:06 +0300
From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
On 16.07.2018 13:13, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com> wrote:
>
>> On 16.07.2018 01:44, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>>>
>>> * Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Thu, Jul 12, 2018 at 2:22 PM, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 12.07.2018 23:50, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>>>>>> Let's make sure informed users have an easy runtime way out
>>>>>> from the worst of the overhead that doesn't involve "recompile your distro
>>>>>> kernel". Also, make it easier to measure and fingerpoint the overhead...
>>>>>
>>>>> Would you like the following solution?
>>>>>
>>>>> I'll create the CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE config option, which would be
>>>>> similar to CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE. That option will provide a sysctl
>>>>> switch disabling stackleak_erase(), which provides the most of performance penalty.
>>>>
>>>> I don't think CONFIG/sysctl is the way to go. I'd recommend making it
>>>> a boot arg and using a static key, similar to what's happening to
>>>> hardened_usercopy:
>>>
>>> Why no sysctl? It's a PITA to reboot systems just to turn a stupid knob off.
>>>
>>> Also, it's _much_ easier to measure performance impact when there's a sysctl.
>>
>> Yes, you are right.
>>
>> But I looked carefully and now see the troubles which sysctl would bring us.
>> Each 'task_struct' has 'lowest_stack', which must be initialized before enabling
>> STACKLEAK. So runtime enabling via sysctl is not plain and may bring race
>> conditions.
>
> Firstly, a sysctl could still allow it to be *disabled*, once - which is the most
> important usecase of the sysctl anyway.
Yes, agree, such a fuse will work fine.
> Secondly, in the first iteration this could be kept included unconditionally:
>
> current->lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - THREAD_SIZE/64;
>
> ... which would keep it initialized and wouldn't be racy, right?
No, this will break the poison search logic.
'lowest_stack' is updated during syscall handling (the gcc plugin
instrumentation is responsible for that) and is reset in stackleak_erase() at
the end of syscall. The stackleak_erase() searching and erasing logic _depends_
on that fact. Enabling STACKLEAK at some arbitrary moment would not be trivial -
let's avoid that for now please.
> I.e. only the most expensive part of the function, the scanning, would be turned
> off via the sysctl. I submit that this will avoid all measurable aspects of the 1%
> kbuild performance overhead.
Yes, I've made an experiment - skipping stackleak_erase() cuts almost all
performance penalty of the feature.
> A more involved approach can be done in the future if warranted, and the feature
> could be disabled/enabled more thoroughly - but the runtime sysctl would be
> acceptable for me for now, as a first iteration.
Thanks, I see your point.
I'll return with an additional patch introducing sysctl knob + static key for
one-time disabling of stack erasing.
Best regards,
Alexander
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