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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+Vc3U6C3UO1CVYN+EmguJdoPCuatOJ2vpAx=r1jbmwjQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2018 14:32:57 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Pax Team <pageexec@...email.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@....com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
"Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>,
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Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>, Nick Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
dingtianhong <dingtianhong@...wei.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>, Jürgen Groß <jgross@...e.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@...ux.intel.com>, Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>,
Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@...tuozzo.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
On Thu, Jul 12, 2018 at 2:22 PM, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com> wrote:
> On 12.07.2018 23:50, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>> Let's make sure informed users have an easy runtime way out
>> from the worst of the overhead that doesn't involve "recompile your distro
>> kernel". Also, make it easier to measure and fingerpoint the overhead...
>
> Would you like the following solution?
>
> I'll create the CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE config option, which would be
> similar to CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE. That option will provide a sysctl
> switch disabling stackleak_erase(), which provides the most of performance penalty.
I don't think CONFIG/sysctl is the way to go. I'd recommend making it
a boot arg and using a static key, similar to what's happening to
hardened_usercopy:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10505059/
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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