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Message-ID: <20180703201931.79b546f8@computer.lan>
Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2018 20:19:31 +0200
From: Hanno Böck <hanno@...eck.de>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Patch for SymlinksIfOwnerMatches
Hi,
There's a nasty problem in many webserver configurations on multiuser
systems, I've blogged about it a while ago [1]. With a symlink it's
often possible to read out configuration files of other users. This was
famously used in the freedom hosting II hack [2].
grsecurity had a workaround for this: By not allowing file operations
to follow symlinks if the owner of the link and the target don't match
it can block this kind of attack.
I saw a need to keep this feature alive in a post-grsecurity world, so
a while ago I extracted it from the grsecurity patch. I've now made
that public:
https://github.com/hannob/symlinkown
I'm not sure about upstreaming, I think it's a worthy feature, but it
might need some work in polishing it. But for now I'll just share it
and I will hopefully be able to keep the patch working for future
kernels.
[1]
https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/873-The-tricky-security-issue-with-FollowSymLinks-and-Apache.html
[2]
https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/55990/deep-web/freedom-hosting-ii-hack.html
--
Hanno Böck
https://hboeck.de/
mail/jabber: hanno@...eck.de
GPG: FE73757FA60E4E21B937579FA5880072BBB51E42
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