kernel-hardening mailing list - 2018/07

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kernel-hardening mailing list - 2018/07

Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun
						¹ 3
² 10	³ 16	⁴ 5	⁵ 6	⁶ 1	⁷ 4	⁸ 1
⁹	¹⁰ 1	¹¹ 9	¹² 12	¹³	¹⁴	¹⁵ 2
¹⁶ 8	¹⁷ 4	¹⁸ 5	¹⁹ 16	²⁰ 18	²¹	²²
²³ 1	²⁴ 6	²⁵ 3	²⁶ 5	²⁷ 13	²⁸ 3	²⁹
³⁰ 4	³¹ 4

Messages by day:

July 1 (3 messages)

Re: [PATCH v3 12/16] treewide: Use array_size() for kmalloc()-family (Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@...6.fr>)
Re: [PATCH v3 12/16] treewide: Use array_size() for kmalloc()-family (SF Markus Elfring <elfring@...rs.sourceforge.net>)
Re: [PATCH v3 12/16] treewide: Use array_size() for kmalloc()-family (SF Markus Elfring <elfring@...rs.sourceforge.net>)

July 2 (10 messages)

Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack (Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>)
Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v4] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Christoph von Recklinghausen <crecklin@...hat.com>)
[PATCH v5] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Christoph von Recklinghausen <crecklin@...hat.com>)

July 3 (16 messages)

[PATCH] gcc-plugins: remove unused GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR (Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>)
Re: [PATCH] gcc-plugins: remove unused GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] gcc-plugins: remove unused GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR (Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>)
Re: [PATCH] gcc-plugins: remove unused GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>)
[PATCH v6] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack (Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>)
Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack (Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>)
Patch for SymlinksIfOwnerMatches (Hanno Böck <hanno@...eck.de>)
Re: Patch for SymlinksIfOwnerMatches (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: Patch for SymlinksIfOwnerMatches (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: Patch for SymlinksIfOwnerMatches (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[PATCH v7] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@...hat.com>)
Re: Patch for SymlinksIfOwnerMatches (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: Patch for SymlinksIfOwnerMatches (Hanno Böck <hanno@...eck.de>)

July 4 (5 messages)

Re: [PATCH v7] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v7] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>)
Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack (Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v7] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v7] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>)

July 5 (6 messages)

[PATCH] gcc-plugins: split out Kconfig entries to scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig (Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>)
Re: [PATCH v13 (resend) 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v13 (resend) 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>)
Re: [PATCH v13 (resend) 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v13 (resend) 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v13 (resend) 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)

July 6 (1 message)

Re: [PATCH v13 (resend) 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)

July 7 (4 messages)

[PATCH RFC V2 0/3] KASLR feature to randomize each loadable module (Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>)
[PATCH 1/3] vmalloc: Add __vmalloc_node_try_addr function (Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>)
[PATCH 2/3] x86/modules: Increase randomization for modules (Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>)
[PATCH 3/3] vmalloc: Add debugfs modfraginfo (Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>)

July 8 (1 message)

Re: [PATCH] sg, bsg: mitigate read/write abuse, block uaccess in release (Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>)

July 10 (1 message)

Re: [PATCH] sg, bsg: mitigate read/write abuse, block uaccess in release (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)

July 11 (9 messages)

Re: [PATCH] sg, bsg: mitigate read/write abuse, block uaccess in release (Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>)
[PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
[PATCH v14 1/6] gcc-plugins: Clean up the cgraph_create_edge* macros (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
[PATCH v14 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
[PATCH v14 3/6] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
[PATCH v14 4/6] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
[PATCH v14 5/6] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
[PATCH v14 6/6] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)

July 12 (12 messages)

[PATCH] arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] gcc-plugins: split out Kconfig entries to scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH] arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack (Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)

July 15 (2 messages)

Re: [PATCH v7] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)

July 16 (8 messages)

Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v7] add param that allows bootline control of hardened usercopy (Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>)
Re: [PATCH v4] bsg: mitigate read/write abuse, block uaccess in release (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4] bsg: mitigate read/write abuse, block uaccess in release (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
[PATCH v4] bsg: mitigate read/write abuse, block uaccess in release (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4] bsg: mitigate read/write abuse, block uaccess in release (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)

July 17 (4 messages)

Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)

July 18 (5 messages)

[RFC] kconfig: add hardened defconfig helpers (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [RFC] kconfig: add hardened defconfig helpers (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
[PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
[PATCH 1/2] arm64: Introduce current_stack_type (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
[PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)

July 19 (16 messages)

Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] vmalloc: Add debugfs modfraginfo (kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
Re: [RFC] kconfig: add hardened defconfig helpers (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack (Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>)
Re: [PATCH 1/2] arm64: Introduce current_stack_type (Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>)
[PATCH v14 7/7] stackleak, sysctl: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack (Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>)
Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM (Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>)
[PATCH 1/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation (Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>)
[PATCH 2/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding arbitrary data pointer in kvm memslot itterator functions (Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>)
[PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE (Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
[PATCHv2 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
[PATCHv2 1/2] arm64: Add stack information to on_accessible_stack (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
[PATCHv2 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)

July 20 (18 messages)

Re: [PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE (Ahmed Soliman <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE (Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>)
Re: [PATCH 1/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation (Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCHv2 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [RFC] kconfig: add hardened defconfig helpers (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCHv2 1/2] arm64: Add stack information to on_accessible_stack (Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>)
Re: [PATCHv2 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack (Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>)
Re: Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>)
Re: [RFC] kconfig: add hardened defconfig helpers (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
Re: [PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE (Ahmed Soliman <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>)
[PATCHv3 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
[PATCHv3 1/2] arm64: Add stack information to on_accessible_stack (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
[PATCHv3 2/2] arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM V4 (Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>)
[PATCH RFC V4 1/3] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation (Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>)
[PATCH RFC V4 2/3] KVM: X86: Adding arbitrary data pointer in kvm memslot iterator functions (Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>)
[PATCH RFC V4 3/3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE (Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>)

July 23 (1 message)

Re: [RFC] kconfig: add hardened defconfig helpers (Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>)

July 24 (6 messages)

Re: [PATCHv3 2/2] arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCHv3 2/2] arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 (Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v14 7/7] stackleak, sysctl: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing (Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v14 7/7] stackleak, sysctl: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v14 7/7] stackleak, sysctl: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing (Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>)

July 25 (3 messages)

Re: [PATCH RFC V4 3/3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE (David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 (Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>)
Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)

July 26 (5 messages)

Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 (Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v14 7/7] stackleak, sysctl: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
[PATCH v14 7/7] stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v14 7/7] stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing (Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>)

July 27 (13 messages)

Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses ("Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses ("Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>)

July 28 (3 messages)

Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses ("Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>)
Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Sandeep Patil <sspatil@...gle.com>)
Re: [RFC] kconfig: add hardened defconfig helpers (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

July 30 (4 messages)

Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses (Sandeep Patil <sspatil@...gle.com>)
Re: [RFC] kconfig: add hardened defconfig helpers (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [RFC] kconfig: add hardened defconfig helpers (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
Re: [RFC] kconfig: add hardened defconfig helpers (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

July 31 (4 messages)

Re: [RFC] kconfig: add hardened defconfig helpers (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
[PATCH] mac80211_hwsim: Fix possible Spectre-v1 for hwsim_world_regdom_custom (Jinbum Park <jinb.park7@...il.com>)
[PATCH] perf/core: Fix possible Spectre-v1 for perf_swevent_enabled (Jinbum Park <jinb.park7@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH] perf/core: Fix possible Spectre-v1 for perf_swevent_enabled (kbuild test robot <lkp@...el.com>)

160 messages

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