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Message-Id: <1529686717-16017-1-git-send-email-alex.popov@linux.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2018 19:58:31 +0300
From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@....com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
"Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>,
Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Josef Bacik <jbacik@...com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@...wei.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@...ux.intel.com>,
Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>,
Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@...tuozzo.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
alex.popov@...ux.com
Subject: [PATCH v13 (resend) 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
This is the rebased 13th version of the patch series introducing STACKLEAK
to the mainline kernel for x86. Ingo Molnar asked to resend it.
This version comes with style changes according to the feedback from Ingo.
Previous version discussion:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/05/16/1
arm64 support will come in a separate patch from Laura Abbott.
Motivation
==========
STACKLEAK (initially developed by PaX Team):
1. reduces the information that can be revealed through kernel stack leak bugs.
The idea of erasing the thread stack at the end of syscalls is similar to
CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING and memzero_explicit() in kernel crypto, which all
comply with FDP_RIP.2 (Full Residual Information Protection) of the
Common Criteria standard.
2. blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2017-17712,
CVE-2010-2963). That kind of bugs should be killed by improving C compilers
in future, which might take a long time.
3. blocks stack depth overflow caused by alloca (aka Stack Clash attack).
That is orthogonal to the mainline kernel VLA cleanup and protects
un-upstreamed code.
Performance impact
==================
Hardware: Intel Core i7-4770, 16 GB RAM
Test #1: building the Linux kernel on a single core
0.91% slowdown
Test #2: hackbench -s 4096 -l 2000 -g 15 -f 25 -P
4.2% slowdown
So the STACKLEAK description in Kconfig includes:
"The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel
compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you are
advised to test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it".
Alexander Popov (6):
gcc-plugins: Clean up the cgraph_create_edge* macros
x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of
syscalls
gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack
lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system
doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature
Documentation/security/self-protection.rst | 23 +-
Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 2 +
arch/Kconfig | 53 ++++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 14 +
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 7 +
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 3 +
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 5 +
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 31 ++
drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile | 2 +
drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 3 +
drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 5 +
drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c | 146 +++++++++
fs/proc/base.c | 18 ++
include/linux/sched.h | 5 +
include/linux/stackleak.h | 27 ++
kernel/Makefile | 4 +
kernel/fork.c | 3 +
kernel/stackleak.c | 96 ++++++
scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins | 3 +
scripts/gcc-plugins/gcc-common.h | 26 +-
scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c | 480 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
22 files changed, 938 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/stackleak.h
create mode 100644 kernel/stackleak.c
create mode 100644 scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
--
2.7.4
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