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Message-ID: <4b7e94c1-79c9-0380-25c6-762762ed595f@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 16:07:01 -0700
From: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack
On 05/02/2018 02:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> wrote:
>>
>> Implementation of stackleak based heavily on the x86 version
>
> Awesome! Notes below for both you and Alexander, since I think we can
> create a common code base instead of having near-duplicates in the
> arch/ trees...
>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
>> ---
>> Now written in C instead of a bunch of assembly.
>> ---
>> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
>> arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 6 ++++
>> arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 3 ++
>> arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 6 ++++
>> arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 16 ++++++++++
>> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 +-
>> scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins | 5 +++-
>> 8 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>> index eb2cf4938f6d..b0221db95dc9 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>> @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ config ARM64
>> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
>> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
>> select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
>> + select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
>> select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
>> select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
>> select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
>> index 767598932549..d31ab80ff647 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
>> @@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ struct thread_struct {
>> unsigned long fault_address; /* fault info */
>> unsigned long fault_code; /* ESR_EL1 value */
>> struct debug_info debug; /* debugging */
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> + unsigned long lowest_stack;
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
>> + unsigned long prev_lowest_stack;
>> +#endif
>> +#endif
>
> I wonder if x86 and arm64 could include a common struct here that was
> empty when the plugin is disabled... it would keep the ifdefs in one
> place. Maybe include/linux/stackleak.h could be:
>
> ---start---
> /* Poison value points to the unused hole in the virtual memory map */
> #define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF
> #define STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH 128
>
> struct stackleak {
> #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> unsigned long lowest;
> #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
> unsigned long prev_lowest;
> #endif
> #endif
> };
>
Is this well defined across all compilers if the plugin is off?
This seems to compile with gcc at least but 0 sized structs
make me a little uneasy.
> asmlinkage void erase_kstack(void);
> ---eof---
>
> and arch/*/include/asm/processor.h could do:
>
> @@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ struct thread_struct {
> unsigned long fault_address; /* fault info */
> unsigned long fault_code; /* ESR_EL1 value */
> struct debug_info debug; /* debugging */
> + struct stackleak stackleak;
>
> and arch/x86/entry/erase.c could move to maybe kernel/stackleak.c?
> (Oh, I notice this needs an SPDX line too.)
>
>> static inline void arch_thread_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset,
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
>> index bf825f38d206..0ceea613c65b 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
>> @@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o
>> arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o
>> arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE) += sdei.o
>>
>> +arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += erase.o
>> +KASAN_SANITIZE_erase.o := n
>> +
>> obj-y += $(arm64-obj-y) vdso/ probes/
>> obj-m += $(arm64-obj-m)
>> head-y := head.o
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> index ec2ee720e33e..3144f1ebdc18 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> @@ -401,6 +401,11 @@ tsk .req x28 // current thread_info
>>
>> .text
>>
>> + .macro ERASE_KSTACK
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> + bl erase_kstack
>> +#endif
>> + .endm
>> /*
>> * Exception vectors.
>> */
>> @@ -906,6 +911,7 @@ ret_to_user:
>> cbnz x2, work_pending
>> finish_ret_to_user:
>> enable_step_tsk x1, x2
>> + ERASE_KSTACK
>> kernel_exit 0
>> ENDPROC(ret_to_user)
>
> Nice. All of the return paths end up here (I went looking for
> ret_from_fork's path). :)
>
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..b8b5648d893b
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
>> +#include <linux/bug.h>
>> +#include <linux/sched.h>
>> +#include <asm/current.h>
>> +#include <asm/linkage.h>
>> +#include <asm/processor.h>
>> +
>> +asmlinkage void erase_kstack(void)
>> +{
>> + unsigned long p = current->thread.lowest_stack;
>> + unsigned long boundary = p & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1);
>> + unsigned long poison = 0;
>> + const unsigned long check_depth = STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH /
>> + sizeof(unsigned long);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Let's search for the poison value in the stack.
>> + * Start from the lowest_stack and go to the bottom.
>> + */
>> + while (p > boundary && poison <= check_depth) {
>> + if (*(unsigned long *)p == STACKLEAK_POISON)
>> + poison++;
>> + else
>> + poison = 0;
>> +
>> + p -= sizeof(unsigned long);
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * One long int at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and
>> + * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK).
>> + */
>> + if (p == boundary)
>> + p += sizeof(unsigned long);
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
>> + current->thread.prev_lowest_stack = p;
>> +#endif
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * So let's write the poison value to the kernel stack.
>> + * Start from the address in p and move up till the new boundary.
>> + */
>> + boundary = current_stack_pointer;
>
> This is the only difference between x86 and arm64 in this code. What
> do you think about implementing on_thread_stack() to match x86:
>
> if (on_thread_stack())
> boundary = current_stack_pointer;
> else
> boundary = current_top_of_stack();
>
> then we could make this common code too instead of having two copies in arch/?
>
The issue isn't on_thread_stack, it's current_top_of_stack which isn't
defined on arm64. I agree it would be good if the code would be common
but I'm not sure how much we want to start trying to force APIs.
>> + BUG_ON(boundary - p >= THREAD_SIZE);
>> +
>> + while (p < boundary) {
>> + *(unsigned long *)p = STACKLEAK_POISON;
>> + p += sizeof(unsigned long);
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Reset the lowest_stack value for the next syscall */
>> + current->thread.lowest_stack = current_stack_pointer;
>> +}
>> +
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
>> index f08a2ed9db0d..156fa0a0da19 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
>> @@ -364,6 +364,9 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,
>> p->thread.cpu_context.pc = (unsigned long)ret_from_fork;
>> p->thread.cpu_context.sp = (unsigned long)childregs;
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> + p->thread.lowest_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p);
>> +#endif
>> ptrace_hw_copy_thread(p);
>>
>> return 0;
>> @@ -493,3 +496,16 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void)
>> {
>> current->mm->context.flags = is_compat_task() ? MMCF_AARCH32 : 0;
>> }
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> +void __used check_alloca(unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> + unsigned long sp, stack_left;
>> +
>> + sp = current_stack_pointer;
>> +
>> + stack_left = sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1);
>> + BUG_ON(stack_left < 256 || size >= stack_left - 256);
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_alloca);
>
> This is pretty different from x86. Is this just an artifact of ORC, or
> something else?
>
This was based on the earlier version of x86. I'll confess to
not seeing how the current x86 version ended up with get_stack_info
but I suspect it's either related to ORC unwinding or it's best
practice.
>> +#endif
>> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
>> index a34e9290a699..25dd2a14560d 100644
>> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
>> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
>> @@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt
>> KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(cflags-y) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
>> -D__NO_FORTIFY \
>> $(call cc-option,-ffreestanding) \
>> - $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector)
>> + $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) \
>> + $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
>>
>> GCOV_PROFILE := n
>> KASAN_SANITIZE := n
>> diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
>> index 8d6070fc538f..6cc0e35d3324 100644
>> --- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
>> +++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
>> @@ -37,11 +37,14 @@ ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS
>>
>> gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += stackleak_plugin.so
>> gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += -DSTACKLEAK_PLUGIN -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-min-size=$(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE)
>> + ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> + DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable
>> + endif
>>
>> GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(strip $(addprefix -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/, $(gcc-plugin-y)) $(gcc-plugin-cflags-y))
>>
>> export PLUGINCC GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS GCC_PLUGIN GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR
>> - export SANCOV_PLUGIN DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN
>> + export SANCOV_PLUGIN DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN
>>
>> ifneq ($(PLUGINCC),)
>> # SANCOV_PLUGIN can be only in CFLAGS_KCOV because avoid duplication.
>> --
>> 2.14.3
>>
>
> -Kees
>
Thanks,
Laura
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