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Message-ID: <b63d4f30-4473-3487-20d6-6d590c12d51c@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2018 11:33:05 -0700
From: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Alexander Popov
<alex.popov@...ux.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@....com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>, "Dmitry V . Levin"
<ldv@...linux.org>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Josef Bacik <jbacik@...com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>, Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@...wei.com>, David Woodhouse
<dwmw@...zon.co.uk>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@...ux.intel.com>, Kyle Huey
<me@...ehuey.com>, Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@...tuozzo.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack
at the end of syscalls
On 04/16/2018 11:29 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 6, 2018 at 7:22 AM, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com> wrote:
>> This commit introduces the architecture-specific code filling the used
>> part of the kernel stack with a poison value before returning to the
>> userspace. Full STACKLEAK feature also contains the gcc plugin which
>> comes in a separate commit.
>
> Thanks for sending this again! And thanks for the updated reasoning
> for why this remains a valuable addition:
>
> https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1523024546-6150-1-git-send-email-alex.popov@linux.com
>
> I, too, remain convinced this is a good protection to have, even as we
> slowly remove VLAs and try to improve the compiler's initialization of
> stack variables.
>
> Dave, Ingo, Linus: how does this look? With the assembly rewritten
> into C, the entry changes are very small:
>
>> arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 7 ++++++
>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 3 +++
>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 5 ++++
>> arch/x86/entry/erase.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
> I'd really like to get people's Ack/Review. :)
>
> Laura, can this C version work for arm64 as well?
>
> Thanks,
>
> -Kees
>
I did a quick port and it seems to work on a minimal system
(passes LKDTM tests). I'll clean it up and do a few more
tests to send out and see about give this series another
review.
Thanks,
Laura
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