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Message-ID: <20180327123248.GI16308@e103592.cambridge.arm.com> Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 13:32:50 +0100 From: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <Mark.Rutland@....com>, Catalin Marinas <Catalin.Marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <Will.Deacon@....com>, "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 33/38] arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 10:41:09AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com> wrote: > > [Dropped most of the original Cc list, since most people are unlikely to > > care about this thread archaeology.] > > > > On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 12:06:17PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > >> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 4:24 AM, Dave P Martin <Dave.Martin@....com> wrote: > >> > On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 02:03:05AM +0000, Kees Cook wrote: > >> >> This whitelists the FPU register state portion of the thread_struct for > >> >> copying to userspace, instead of the default entire structure. > >> >> > >> >> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com> > >> >> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com> > >> >> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com> > >> >> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> > >> >> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@....com> > >> >> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org> > >> >> Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com> > >> >> Cc: zijun_hu <zijun_hu@....com> > >> >> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org > >> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> > >> >> --- > >> >> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + > >> >> arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 8 ++++++++ > >> >> 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+) > >> >> > >> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig > >> >> index a93339f5178f..c84477e6a884 100644 > >> >> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig > >> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig > >> >> @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ config ARM64 > >> >> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS > >> >> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT > >> >> select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER > >> >> + select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST > >> >> select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK > >> >> select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE > >> >> select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK > >> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h > >> >> index 023cacb946c3..e58a5864ec89 100644 > >> >> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h > >> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h > >> >> @@ -113,6 +113,14 @@ struct thread_struct { > >> >> struct debug_info debug; /* debugging */ > >> >> }; > >> >> > >> >> +/* Whitelist the fpsimd_state for copying to userspace. */ > >> >> +static inline void arch_thread_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset, > >> >> + unsigned long *size) > >> >> +{ > >> >> + *offset = offsetof(struct thread_struct, fpsimd_state); > >> >> + *size = sizeof(struct fpsimd_state); > >> > > >> > This should be fpsimd_state.user_fpsimd (fpsimd_state.cpu is important > >> > for correctly context switching and not supposed to be user-accessible. > >> > A user copy that encompasses that is definitely a bug). > >> > >> So, I actually spent some more time looking at this due to the > >> comments from rmk on arm32, and I don't think any whitelist is needed > >> here at all. (i.e. it can be *offset = *size = 0) This is because all > >> the usercopying I could find uses static sizes or bounce buffers, both > >> of which bypass the dynamic-size hardened usercopy checks. > >> > >> I've been running some arm64 builds now with this change, and I > >> haven't tripped over any problems yet... > > > > Hmmm, it looks like we may be hitting this with user_regset_copyout() > > when reading the fp regs via ptrace. This is maybe not surprising, > > Did you get one of the WARNs for it? Mark Rutland got it by running Syzkaller, but it's easily reproducible with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY enabled. > > since the size comes from userspace for PTRACE_{GET,SET}REGSET. > > Also, while we copy into a bounce buffer for SETREGSET here, we do copy > > straight out of task_struct for GETREGSET here. > > Hm, yeah, > > > This suggests we should have: > > > > *offset = offsetof(struct thread_struct, fpsimd_state); > > *size = sizeof(struct user_fpsimd_state); > > This is what I had originally for arm64, but when I tried exercising > this code more recently, it didn't need the whitelist. It really looks > like I forgot what I had tested the first time, though. :P > > > Thoughts? > > Seems like it would be tripped by: > > static int __fpr_get(struct task_struct *target, > const struct user_regset *regset, > unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, > void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf, unsigned int start_pos) > { > struct user_fpsimd_state *uregs; > > sve_sync_to_fpsimd(target); > > uregs = &target->thread.fpsimd_state.user_fpsimd; > > return user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, uregs, > start_pos, start_pos + sizeof(*uregs)); > } > > And similarly __fpr_set(), compat_vfp_get(), compat_vfp_set(), > sve_get(), and sve_set(), ? All are probably affected except for __fpr_set() which uses a bounce buffer. I'm not sure why though: compat_vfp_set() doesn't use a bounce buffer, though it's not trying to do anything different. > > I'm making some assumptions about how the usercopy hardening works. > > I think you're right -- I just tricked myself after looking at arm32. OK, I'll send a patch once we've retested. Cheers ---Dave
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