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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKEM8ot_YQ8Jt=npGrVWSwj=ROse4YOyQb9QmpEQkx=sg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 13:55:22 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@...rochip.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, linux-crypto <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto/ecc: Remove stack VLA usage
On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 1:43 AM, Tudor Ambarus
<tudor.ambarus@...rochip.com> wrote:
> Hi, Kees,
>
>
> On 03/07/2018 11:56 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> On the quest to remove all VLAs from the kernel[1], this switches to
>> a pair of kmalloc regions instead of using the stack. This also moves
>> the get_random_bytes() after all allocations (and drops the needless
>> "nbytes" variable).
>>
>> [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> ---
>> crypto/ecc.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------
>> 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/crypto/ecc.c b/crypto/ecc.c
>> index 18f32f2a5e1c..5bfa63603da0 100644
>> --- a/crypto/ecc.c
>> +++ b/crypto/ecc.c
>> @@ -1025,9 +1025,7 @@ int crypto_ecdh_shared_secret(unsigned int curve_id,
>> unsigned int ndigits,
>> {
>> int ret = 0;
>> struct ecc_point *product, *pk;
>> - u64 priv[ndigits];
>> - u64 rand_z[ndigits];
>> - unsigned int nbytes;
>> + u64 *priv, *rand_z;
>> const struct ecc_curve *curve = ecc_get_curve(curve_id);
>> if (!private_key || !public_key || !curve) {
>> @@ -1035,14 +1033,22 @@ int crypto_ecdh_shared_secret(unsigned int
>> curve_id, unsigned int ndigits,
>> goto out;
>> }
>> - nbytes = ndigits << ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT;
>> + priv = kmalloc_array(ndigits, sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!priv) {
>> + ret = -ENOMEM;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> - get_random_bytes(rand_z, nbytes);
>> + rand_z = kmalloc_array(ndigits, sizeof(*rand_z), GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!rand_z) {
>> + ret = -ENOMEM;
>> + goto kfree_out;
>> + }
>> pk = ecc_alloc_point(ndigits);
>> if (!pk) {
>> ret = -ENOMEM;
>> - goto out;
>> + goto kfree_out;
>> }
>> product = ecc_alloc_point(ndigits);
>> @@ -1051,6 +1057,8 @@ int crypto_ecdh_shared_secret(unsigned int curve_id,
>> unsigned int ndigits,
>> goto err_alloc_product;
>> }
>> + get_random_bytes(rand_z, ndigits << ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT);
>> +
>> ecc_swap_digits(public_key, pk->x, ndigits);
>> ecc_swap_digits(&public_key[ndigits], pk->y, ndigits);
>> ecc_swap_digits(private_key, priv, ndigits);
>> @@ -1065,6 +1073,9 @@ int crypto_ecdh_shared_secret(unsigned int curve_id,
>> unsigned int ndigits,
>> ecc_free_point(product);
>> err_alloc_product:
>> ecc_free_point(pk);
>> +kfree_out:
>> + kfree(priv);
>
>
> I think we should use kzfree here.
>
>> + kfree(rand_z);
>
>
> Probably here too.
Ah yeah, good idea. I'll send a v2.
> Looks like there are few intermediate buffers in ecc
> that should be zeroized as well.
Can you send a patch for those?
Thanks!
-Kees
>
> Best,
> ta
>>
>> out:
>> return ret;
>> }
>>
>
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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