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Message-ID: <7082be04-d6af-b853-4bb7-f331836662e2@digikod.net>
Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 00:06:55 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
David Drysdale
<drysdale@...gle.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>, Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged
sandboxing
On 06/03/2018 23:46, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 06, 2018 at 10:33:17PM +0000, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>> Suppose I'm writing a container manager. I want to run "mount" in the
>>>> container, but I don't want to allow moun() in general and I want to
>>>> emulate certain mount() actions. I can write a filter that catches
>>>> mount using seccomp and calls out to the container manager for help.
>>>> This isn't theoretical -- Tycho wants *exactly* this use case to be
>>>> supported.
>>>
>>> Well, I think this use case should be handled with something like
>>> LD_PRELOAD and a helper library. FYI, I did something like this:
>>> https://github.com/stemjail/stemshim
>>
>> I doubt that will work for containers. Containers that use user
>> namespaces and, for example, setuid programs aren't going to honor
>> LD_PRELOAD.
>
> Or anything that calls syscalls directly, like go programs.
That's why the vDSO-like approach. Enforcing an access control is not
the issue here, patching a buggy userland (without patching its code) is
the issue isn't it?
As far as I remember, the main problem is to handle file descriptors
while "emulating" the kernel behavior. This can be done with a "shim"
code mapped in every processes. Chrome used something like this (in a
previous sandbox mechanism) as a kind of emulation (with the current
seccomp-bpf ). I think it should be doable to replace the (userland)
emulation code with an IPC wrapper receiving file descriptors through
UNIX socket.
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