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Message-ID: <CA+55aFxEAYyrUkApo-dtZvxcYbvWBZJpUytjbm7e2wruTvbYjQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2018 12:15:11 -0800
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@....com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>, "Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>,
Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Josef Bacik <jbacik@...com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>, Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@...wei.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>, Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>, Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@...ux.intel.com>,
Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>, Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@...tuozzo.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v9 4/7] x86/entry: Erase kernel stack in syscall_trace_enter()
This is the first I see of any of this, it was apparently not actually
posted to lkml or anything like that.
Honestly, what I see just makes me go "this is security-masturbation".
It doesn't actually seem to help *find* bugs at all. As such, it's
another "paper over and forget" thing that just adds fairly high
overhead when it's enabled.
I'm NAK'ing it sight-unseen (see above) just because I'm tired of
these kinds of pointless things that don't actually strive to improve
on the kernel, just add more and more overhead for nebulous "things
may happen", and that just make the code uglier.
Why wasn't it even posted to lkml?
And why isn't the focus of security people on tools to _analyse_ and
find problems?
Linus
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