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Message-ID: <089e9c52-f623-085a-4d8b-d91cfc6a3608@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 22:31:38 +0100
From: lazytyped <lazytyped@...il.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Ilya Smith <blackzert@...il.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Jerome Glisse <jglisse@...hat.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Helge Deller <deller@....de>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] Randomization of address chosen by mmap.
On 2/27/18 9:52 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> I'd like more details on the threat model here; if it's just a matter
> of .so loading order, I wonder if load order randomization would get a
> comparable level of uncertainty without the memory fragmentation,
This also seems to assume that leaking the address of one single library
isn't enough to mount a ROP attack to either gain enough privileges or
generate a primitive that can leak further information. Is this really
the case? Do you have some further data around this?
- twiz
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