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Message-Id: <20180209133936.100956467@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Fri,  9 Feb 2018 14:39:36 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org,
	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
	torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
	alan@...ux.intel.com,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 67/92] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>


(cherry picked from commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360)

Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
mitigation for __user pointer de-references.

Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@...uxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@...ux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@...ux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
-	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+	return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 }
 
 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,


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