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Message-Id: <20180209133935.882457967@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Fri,  9 Feb 2018 14:39:33 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	alan@...ux.intel.com,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 64/92] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>


(cherry picked from commit 2fbd7af5af8665d18bcefae3e9700be07e22b681)

The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel
space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation.

While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it
does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory
relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache
behavior.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@...uxfoundation.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: alan@...ux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417984.33451.1216731042505722161.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/entry/common.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
 #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/uprobes.h>
 
 #include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -277,7 +278,8 @@ __visible void do_syscall_64(struct pt_r
 	 * regs->orig_ax, which changes the behavior of some syscalls.
 	 */
 	if (likely((nr & __SYSCALL_MASK) < NR_syscalls)) {
-		regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr & __SYSCALL_MASK](
+		nr = array_index_nospec(nr & __SYSCALL_MASK, NR_syscalls);
+		regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr](
 			regs->di, regs->si, regs->dx,
 			regs->r10, regs->r8, regs->r9);
 	}
@@ -313,6 +315,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_3
 	}
 
 	if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) {
+		nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls);
 		/*
 		 * It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation
 		 * takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that


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