|
Message-ID: <151703975686.26578.8851773106290279966.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 23:55:56 -0800 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com> To: tglx@...utronix.de Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, x86@...nel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, alan@...ux.intel.com Subject: [PATCH v5 08/12] x86: sanitize sycall table de-references under speculation The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel space. Use 'array_idx' to prevent any out of bounds speculation. While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache behavior. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com> Cc: x86@...nel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com> --- arch/x86/entry/common.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c index 03505ffbe1b6..f78bf8bfdfae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/context_tracking.h> #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/uprobes.h> #include <linux/livepatch.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> @@ -284,6 +285,7 @@ __visible void do_syscall_64(struct pt_regs *regs) * regs->orig_ax, which changes the behavior of some syscalls. */ if (likely((nr & __SYSCALL_MASK) < NR_syscalls)) { + nr = array_idx(nr & __SYSCALL_MASK, NR_syscalls); regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr & __SYSCALL_MASK]( regs->di, regs->si, regs->dx, regs->r10, regs->r8, regs->r9); @@ -320,6 +322,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs) } if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) { + nr = array_idx(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls); /* * It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation * takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.