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Message-Id: <20180113213441.52047-6-dan@kernelim.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2018 23:34:39 +0200
From: Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption
This commit enables the kernel to encrypt the free-form text that
is generated by printk() before it is brought up to `dmesg` in
userspace.
The encryption is made using one of the trusted public keys which
are kept built-in inside the kernel. These keys are presently
also used for verifying kernel modules and userspace-supplied
firmwares.
CC: Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>
CC: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>
CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>
---
Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/kmsg.h | 18 ++
init/Kconfig | 11 +
kernel/printk/printk.c | 450 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 480 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/kmsg.h
diff --git a/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt b/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt
index 3e3fdae5f3ed..eafa24cddf3f 100644
--- a/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt
+++ b/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt
@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ Code Seq#(hex) Include File Comments
'f' 00-0F fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h conflict!
'g' 00-0F linux/usb/gadgetfs.h
'g' 20-2F linux/usb/g_printer.h
+'g' 30-3F uapi/linux/kmsg.h
'h' 00-7F conflict! Charon filesystem
<mailto:zapman@...erlan.net>
'h' 00-1F linux/hpet.h conflict!
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kmsg.h b/include/uapi/linux/kmsg.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..497040740d69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kmsg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#ifndef _LINUX_UAPI_KMSG_H
+#define _LINUX_UAPI_KMSG_H
+
+#include <linux/ioctl.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct kmsg_ioctl_get_encrypted_key {
+ void __user *output_buffer;
+ __u64 buffer_size;
+ __u64 key_size;
+};
+
+#define KMSG_IOCTL_BASE 'g'
+
+#define KMSG_IOCTL__GET_ENCRYPTED_KEY _IOWR(KMSG_IOCTL_BASE, 0x30, \
+ struct kmsg_ioctl_get_encrypted_key)
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_DN_H */
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index a9a2e2c86671..8e07a8f9e5c6 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1769,6 +1769,17 @@ config MODULE_SIG
debuginfo strip done by some packagers (such as rpmbuild) and
inclusion into an initramfs that wants the module size reduced.
+config KMSG_ENCRYPTION
+ bool "Encrypt /dev/kmsg (viewing dmesg will require decryption!)"
+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ select BASE64_ARMOR
+ help
+ This enables strong encryption of messages generated by the kernel,
+ to defend against most kinds of information leaks.
+
+ Note that this option adds the OpenSSL development packages as a
+ kernel build dependency so that certificates can be generated.
+
config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
bool "Require modules to be validly signed"
depends on MODULE_SIG
diff --git a/kernel/printk/printk.c b/kernel/printk/printk.c
index b9006617710f..898094fb87bd 100644
--- a/kernel/printk/printk.c
+++ b/kernel/printk/printk.c
@@ -48,6 +48,14 @@
#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/base64-armor.h>
+#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/kmsg.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
@@ -100,6 +108,10 @@ enum devkmsg_log_masks {
DEVKMSG_LOG_MASK_LOCK = BIT(__DEVKMSG_LOG_BIT_LOCK),
};
+#define CRYPT_KMSG_KEY_LEN 16
+#define CRYPT_KMSG_AUTH_LEN 16
+#define CRYPT_KMSG_TEXT_META_MAX 32
+
/* Keep both the 'on' and 'off' bits clear, i.e. ratelimit by default: */
#define DEVKMSG_LOG_MASK_DEFAULT 0
@@ -744,12 +756,33 @@ static ssize_t msg_print_ext_body(char *buf, size_t size,
return p - buf;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMSG_ENCRYPTION
+static int __ro_after_init kmsg_encrypt = 1;
+static int __init control_kmsg_encrypt(char *str)
+{
+ get_option(&str, &kmsg_encrypt);
+ return 0;
+}
+__setup("kmsg_encrypt=", control_kmsg_encrypt);
+
+struct devkmsg_crypt {
+ u8 key[CRYPT_KMSG_KEY_LEN];
+ u8 *encrypted_key;
+ size_t encrypted_key_len;
+ bool encrypted_key_read;
+ struct crypto_aead *sk_tfm;
+};
+#else
+struct devkmsg_crypt {};
+#endif
+
/* /dev/kmsg - userspace message inject/listen interface */
struct devkmsg_user {
u64 seq;
u32 idx;
struct ratelimit_state rs;
struct mutex lock;
+ struct devkmsg_crypt crypt;
char buf[CONSOLE_EXT_LOG_MAX];
};
@@ -816,6 +849,358 @@ static ssize_t devkmsg_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
return ret;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMSG_ENCRYPTION
+
+static int devkmsg_encrypt_key(struct devkmsg_crypt *crypt,
+ struct crypto_akcipher *ak_tfm)
+{
+ const struct public_key *pkey;
+ struct akcipher_request *req;
+ unsigned int out_len_max;
+ struct scatterlist src, dst;
+ void *outbuf_enc = NULL;
+ struct crypto_wait wait;
+ struct key *key;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!kmsg_encrypt)
+ return 0;
+
+ key = find_trusted_asymmetric_key(NULL, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ return PTR_ERR(key);
+
+ pkey = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+ BUG_ON(!pkey);
+
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ req = akcipher_request_alloc(ak_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
+ goto exit2;
+
+ err = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(ak_tfm,
+ pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
+ if (err)
+ goto exit;
+
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ out_len_max = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(ak_tfm);
+ outbuf_enc = kzalloc(out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!outbuf_enc)
+ goto exit;
+
+ crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+ sg_init_one(&src, crypt->key, sizeof(crypt->key));
+ sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_enc, out_len_max);
+ akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, sizeof(crypt->key),
+ out_len_max);
+ akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+ err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
+ if (err) {
+ kfree(outbuf_enc);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ crypt->encrypted_key_len = req->dst_len;
+ crypt->encrypted_key = outbuf_enc;
+
+exit:
+ akcipher_request_free(req);
+exit2:
+ key_put(key);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int devkmsg_crypt_init(struct devkmsg_crypt *crypt)
+{
+ struct crypto_akcipher *ak_tfm;
+ struct crypto_aead *sk_tfm;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!kmsg_encrypt)
+ return 0;
+
+ crypt->encrypted_key = NULL;
+ crypt->encrypted_key_len = 0;
+ crypt->encrypted_key_read = false;
+
+ sk_tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(sk_tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(sk_tfm);
+
+ get_random_bytes(crypt->key, sizeof(crypt->key));
+
+ err = crypto_aead_setkey(sk_tfm, crypt->key, sizeof(crypt->key));
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(sk_tfm, CRYPT_KMSG_AUTH_LEN);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ ak_tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher("pkcs1pad(rsa,sha256)", 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(ak_tfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(ak_tfm);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ err = devkmsg_encrypt_key(crypt, ak_tfm);
+ crypto_free_akcipher(ak_tfm);
+
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ crypt->sk_tfm = sk_tfm;
+ return 0;
+
+fail:
+ crypto_free_aead(sk_tfm);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void devkmsg_crypt_free(struct devkmsg_crypt *crypt)
+{
+ if (!kmsg_encrypt)
+ return;
+
+ crypto_free_aead(crypt->sk_tfm);
+ kfree(crypt->encrypted_key);
+}
+
+static int devkmsg_encrypt_inplace(struct devkmsg_user *user,
+ size_t hdr_len, size_t len,
+ size_t *out_len)
+{
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+ const char *newline_pos;
+ const char *prefix = "M:";
+ char suffix[CRYPT_KMSG_TEXT_META_MAX], *ciphertext_start;
+ int all_cryptmsg_encoded_len;
+ int ciphertext_len;
+ int ciphertext_with_auth;
+ int ciphertext_with_auth_iv;
+ int armored_ciphertext_with_auth_iv;
+ int dict_len;
+ int prefix_len = strlen(prefix);
+ int suffix_size;
+ int i;
+ size_t len_no_newline;
+ ssize_t ret;
+ struct aead_request *aead_req;
+ struct scatterlist sgio_in;
+ struct scatterlist sgio_out;
+ u8 *iv;
+ unsigned int iv_len;
+
+ if (!kmsg_encrypt)
+ return 0;
+
+ newline_pos = strnchr(user->buf, len, '\n');
+ if (!newline_pos)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* We do not encrypt the dict, but only the free-form text. */
+ len_no_newline = newline_pos - user->buf;
+
+ /* If dict_len == 1 it's an empty dict, only a '\n' */
+ dict_len = len - len_no_newline;
+
+ aead_req = aead_request_alloc(user->crypt.sk_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!aead_req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ iv_len = crypto_aead_ivsize(user->crypt.sk_tfm);
+
+ ciphertext_len = len_no_newline - hdr_len;
+ ciphertext_with_auth = ciphertext_len + CRYPT_KMSG_AUTH_LEN;
+ ciphertext_with_auth_iv = ciphertext_with_auth + iv_len;
+
+ armored_ciphertext_with_auth_iv =
+ base64_encode_buffer_bound(ciphertext_with_auth_iv);
+
+ all_cryptmsg_encoded_len = hdr_len + prefix_len +
+ armored_ciphertext_with_auth_iv;
+
+ suffix_size =
+ scnprintf(suffix, sizeof(suffix), ",%u,%u",
+ CRYPT_KMSG_AUTH_LEN, iv_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Check that we are not overflowing with the rearrangement
+ * of the encrypted message.
+ */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (all_cryptmsg_encoded_len + suffix_size + dict_len +
+ CRYPT_KMSG_TEXT_META_MAX + ciphertext_with_auth
+ > sizeof(user->buf))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Move away the dict farther down so we don't overwrite it */
+ if (dict_len > 0)
+ memmove(&user->buf[all_cryptmsg_encoded_len + suffix_size],
+ &user->buf[len_no_newline],
+ dict_len);
+
+ /*
+ * We are using the end of user->buf as a staging area for the
+ * ciphertext + auth + iv, before we do base64-encoding of it,
+ * writing the encoded output to its original place, right
+ * after the prefix.
+ */
+
+ /* Initialize IV */
+ iv = &user->buf[sizeof(user->buf) - iv_len];
+
+ get_random_bytes(iv, iv_len);
+
+ /* Do the encryption */
+ sg_init_one(&sgio_in, user->buf + hdr_len, ciphertext_with_auth);
+ sg_init_one(&sgio_out, iv - ciphertext_with_auth, ciphertext_with_auth);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &sgio_in, &sgio_out,
+ ciphertext_len, iv);
+ aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0);
+ aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req), &wait);
+
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Base64-encode the ciphertext + auth code + IV */
+
+ BUG_ON(hdr_len <= 1);
+
+ ciphertext_start = &user->buf[hdr_len + prefix_len];
+ ret = base64_armor(ciphertext_start,
+ armored_ciphertext_with_auth_iv,
+ iv - ciphertext_with_auth,
+ &user->buf[sizeof(user->buf)]);
+
+ BUG_ON(ret < 0); /* Should indicate a real bug buffer bounds */
+
+ /* Convert newlines to '~' */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ret; i++)
+ if (ciphertext_start[i] == '\n')
+ ciphertext_start[i] = '~';
+
+ /* Add prefixes and suffixes */
+
+ memcpy(&user->buf[hdr_len], prefix, prefix_len);
+ memcpy(&user->buf[all_cryptmsg_encoded_len], suffix, suffix_size);
+
+ len = all_cryptmsg_encoded_len + suffix_size + dict_len;
+ BUG_ON(len > sizeof(user->buf));
+
+ *out_len = len;
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ aead_request_free(aead_req);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t devkmsg_encrypt_onetime_piggyback_key(struct devkmsg_user *user,
+ char __user *buf,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ /*
+ * Send down the encryted session key as the first message. We identify
+ * it using the 'K:' prefix.
+ */
+ const char *prefix = "7,0,0,-;K:";
+ size_t prefix_len;
+ size_t base64_len, i;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ char newline = '\n';
+
+ if (user->crypt.encrypted_key_len == 0 ||
+ user->crypt.encrypted_key_read)
+ return 0;
+
+ prefix_len = strlen(prefix);
+
+ if (prefix_len > count)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(buf, prefix, prefix_len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ /* Hex-encode and copy to userspace */
+
+ len += prefix_len;
+
+ /* Base64-encode the ciphertext + auth code + IV */
+
+ base64_len = base64_armor(user->buf, sizeof(user->buf),
+ user->crypt.encrypted_key,
+ &user->crypt.encrypted_key[user->crypt.encrypted_key_len]);
+
+ BUG_ON(base64_len < 0); /* Should indicate a real bug buffer bounds */
+
+ /* Convert newlines to '~' */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < base64_len; i++)
+ if (user->buf[i] == '\n')
+ user->buf[i] = '~';
+
+ if (len + base64_len > count)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(buf + len, user->buf, base64_len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ len += base64_len;
+
+ if (len + 1 > count)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(buf + len, &newline, 1))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ len += 1;
+
+ user->crypt.encrypted_key_read = true;
+ return len;
+}
+
+static bool devkmsg_crypt_allow_syslog(void)
+{
+ return kmsg_encrypt != 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static void devkmsg_crypt_free(struct devkmsg_crypt *crypt) {}
+static int devkmsg_crypt_init(struct devkmsg_crypt *crypt)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int devkmsg_encrypt_inplace(struct devkmsg_user *user,
+ size_t hdr_len, size_t len,
+ size_t *out_len)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t devkmsg_encrypt_onetime_piggyback_key(struct devkmsg_user *user,
+ char __user *buf,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool devkmsg_crypt_allow_syslog(void)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+
+#endif
+
static ssize_t devkmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
@@ -823,6 +1208,7 @@ static ssize_t devkmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
struct printk_log *msg;
size_t len;
ssize_t ret;
+ int hdr_len;
if (!user)
return -EBADF;
@@ -831,6 +1217,10 @@ static ssize_t devkmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
if (ret)
return ret;
+ ret = devkmsg_encrypt_onetime_piggyback_key(user, buf, count);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+
logbuf_lock_irq();
while (user->seq == log_next_seq) {
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
@@ -859,6 +1249,7 @@ static ssize_t devkmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
msg = log_from_idx(user->idx);
len = msg_print_ext_header(user->buf, sizeof(user->buf),
msg, user->seq);
+ hdr_len = len;
len += msg_print_ext_body(user->buf + len, sizeof(user->buf) - len,
log_dict(msg), msg->dict_len,
log_text(msg), msg->text_len);
@@ -867,6 +1258,10 @@ static ssize_t devkmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
user->seq++;
logbuf_unlock_irq();
+ ret = devkmsg_encrypt_inplace(user, hdr_len, len, &len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
if (len > count) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
@@ -876,6 +1271,7 @@ static ssize_t devkmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
+
ret = len;
out:
mutex_unlock(&user->lock);
@@ -943,6 +1339,43 @@ static unsigned int devkmsg_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
return ret;
}
+static long devkmsg_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ switch (ioctl) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMSG_ENCRYPTION
+ case KMSG_IOCTL__GET_ENCRYPTED_KEY: {
+ struct devkmsg_user *user = file->private_data;
+ struct kmsg_ioctl_get_encrypted_key params;
+ int err;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)arg, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!user->crypt.encrypted_key) {
+ err = -ENOENT;
+ } else {
+ params.key_size = user->crypt.encrypted_key_len;
+
+ if (user->crypt.encrypted_key_len > params.buffer_size)
+ err = -E2BIG;
+ else
+ err = copy_to_user(params.output_buffer,
+ user->crypt.encrypted_key,
+ user->crypt.encrypted_key_len);
+ }
+
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return err;
+ }
+#endif
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
+
static int devkmsg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct devkmsg_user *user;
@@ -963,6 +1396,12 @@ static int devkmsg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
if (!user)
return -ENOMEM;
+ err = devkmsg_crypt_init(&user->crypt);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ kfree(user);
+ return err;
+ }
+
ratelimit_default_init(&user->rs);
ratelimit_set_flags(&user->rs, RATELIMIT_MSG_ON_RELEASE);
@@ -987,6 +1426,7 @@ static int devkmsg_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
ratelimit_state_exit(&user->rs);
mutex_destroy(&user->lock);
+ devkmsg_crypt_free(&user->crypt);
kfree(user);
return 0;
}
@@ -997,6 +1437,7 @@ const struct file_operations kmsg_fops = {
.write_iter = devkmsg_write,
.llseek = devkmsg_llseek,
.poll = devkmsg_poll,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = devkmsg_ioctl,
.release = devkmsg_release,
};
@@ -1442,6 +1883,8 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, int source)
case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
break;
case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
+ if (!devkmsg_crypt_allow_syslog())
+ return -EPERM;
if (!buf || len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (!len)
@@ -1460,6 +1903,8 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, int source)
/* FALL THRU */
/* Read last kernel messages */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL:
+ if (!devkmsg_crypt_allow_syslog())
+ return -EPERM;
if (!buf || len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (!len)
@@ -1470,6 +1915,8 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, int source)
break;
/* Clear ring buffer */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR:
+ if (!devkmsg_crypt_allow_syslog())
+ return -EPERM;
syslog_print_all(NULL, 0, true);
break;
/* Disable logging to console */
@@ -1497,6 +1944,9 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, int source)
break;
/* Number of chars in the log buffer */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD:
+ if (!devkmsg_crypt_allow_syslog())
+ return -EPERM;
+
logbuf_lock_irq();
if (syslog_seq < log_first_seq) {
/* messages are gone, move to first one */
--
2.14.3
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