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Message-ID: <151571802258.27429.932636277047687877.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 16:47:02 -0800
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
x86@...nel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
tglx@...utronix.de, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
alan@...ux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and
ASM_IFENCE
For 'get_user' paths, do not allow the kernel to speculate on the value
of a user controlled pointer. In addition to the 'stac' instruction for
Supervisor Mode Access Protection, an 'ifence' causes the 'access_ok'
result to resolve in the pipeline before the cpu might take any
speculative action on the pointer value.
Since this is a major kernel interface that deals with user controlled
data, the '__uaccess_begin_nospec' mechanism will prevent speculative
execution past an 'access_ok' permission check. While speculative
execution past 'access_ok' is not enough to lead to a kernel memory
leak, it is a necessary precondition.
To be clear, '__uaccess_begin_nospec' and ASM_IFENCE are not addressing
any known issues with 'get_user' they are addressing a class of
potential problems that could be near 'get_user' usages. In other words,
these helpers are for hygiene not clinical fixes.
There are no functional changes in this patch.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 10 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
index db333300bd4b..0b59707e0b46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SMAP */
+#define ASM_IFENCE \
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 "", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \
+ "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC
+
#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#include <asm/alternative.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 574dff4d2913..a31fd4fc6483 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -124,6 +124,11 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void);
#define __uaccess_begin() stac()
#define __uaccess_end() clac()
+#define __uaccess_begin_nospec() \
+({ \
+ stac(); \
+ ifence(); \
+})
/*
* This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into
@@ -487,6 +492,11 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; };
__uaccess_begin(); \
barrier();
+#define uaccess_try_nospec do { \
+ current->thread.uaccess_err = 0; \
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
+ barrier();
+
#define uaccess_catch(err) \
__uaccess_end(); \
(err) |= (current->thread.uaccess_err ? -EFAULT : 0); \
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