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Message-Id: <1515636190-24061-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 18:02:34 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@...cle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>,
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@...aro.org>,
Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@...cle.com>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@...nel.org>,
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH 02/38] usercopy: Enhance and rename report_usercopy()
In preparation for refactoring the usercopy checks to pass offset to
the hardened usercopy report, this renames report_usercopy() to the
more accurate usercopy_abort(), marks it as noreturn because it is,
adds a hopefully helpful comment for anyone investigating such reports,
makes the function available to the slab allocators, and adds new "detail"
and "offset" arguments.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
mm/slab.h | 6 ++++++
mm/usercopy.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
tools/objtool/check.c | 1 +
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index ad657ffa44e5..7d29e69ac310 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -526,4 +526,10 @@ static inline int cache_random_seq_create(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
static inline void cache_random_seq_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cachep) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM */
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
+ bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
+ unsigned long len);
+#endif
+
#endif /* MM_SLAB_H */
diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index 5df1e68d4585..8006baa4caac 100644
--- a/mm/usercopy.c
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -58,11 +58,25 @@ static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
return GOOD_STACK;
}
-static void report_usercopy(unsigned long len, bool to_user, const char *type)
+/*
+ * If this function is reached, then CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY has found an
+ * unexpected state during a copy_from_user() or copy_to_user() call.
+ * There are several checks being performed on the buffer by the
+ * __check_object_size() function. Normal stack buffer usage should never
+ * trip the checks, and kernel text addressing will always trip the check.
+ * For cache objects, copies must be within the object size.
+ */
+void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
+ bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
+ unsigned long len)
{
- pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s '%s' (%lu bytes)\n",
- to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
- to_user ? "from" : "to", type ? : "unknown", len);
+ pr_emerg("Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n",
+ to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
+ to_user ? "from" : "to",
+ name ? : "unknown?!",
+ detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "",
+ offset, len);
+
/*
* For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(),
* but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch
@@ -260,6 +274,6 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
return;
report:
- report_usercopy(n, to_user, err);
+ usercopy_abort(err, NULL, to_user, 0, n);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size);
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index 9b341584eb1b..ae39444896d4 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ static int __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
"__reiserfs_panic",
"lbug_with_loc",
"fortify_panic",
+ "usercopy_abort",
};
if (func->bind == STB_WEAK)
--
2.7.4
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