kernel-hardening mailing list - 2018/01

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kernel-hardening mailing list - 2018/01

Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun
¹	²	³ 15	⁴ 7	⁵ 4	⁶ 2	⁷
⁸ 9	⁹ 42	¹⁰ 8	¹¹ 47	¹² 54	¹³ 27	¹⁴ 5
¹⁵ 8	¹⁶ 14	¹⁷ 20	¹⁸ 19	¹⁹ 22	²⁰ 19	²¹ 9
²² 10	²³ 4	²⁴ 13	²⁵ 23	²⁶ 21	²⁷ 17	²⁸ 26
²⁹ 8	³⁰ 31	³¹ 9

Messages by day:

January 3 (15 messages)

Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces (Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) <maheshb@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces (Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) <maheshb@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCHv3 1/2] capability: introduce sysctl for controlled user-ns capability whitelist (Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) <maheshb@...gl…)
[PATCHv4 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces (Mahesh Bandewar <mahesh@...dewar.net>)
[PATCHv4 1/2] capability: introduce sysctl for controlled user-ns capability whitelist (Mahesh Bandewar <mahesh@...dewar.net>)
[PATCHv4 2/2] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces (Mahesh Bandewar <mahesh@...dewar.net>)
Re: [PATCH] arm: kernel: implement fast refcount checking (Jinbum Park <jinb.park7@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH] arm: kernel: implement fast refcount checking (Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>)
Re: [PATCHv4 1/2] capability: introduce sysctl for controlled user-ns capability whitelist (Geo Kozey <geokozey@...lfence.com>)
Re: [PATCHv4 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
[PATCH 4.4 02/37] KAISER: Kernel Address Isolation (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>)
[PATCH 4.9 04/39] KAISER: Kernel Address Isolation (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH 5/5] docs: add dmesg encryption doc (Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>)
Re: [PATCH 0/5] RFC: Public key encryption of dmesg by the kernel (Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>)
Re: [PATCH 5/5] docs: add dmesg encryption doc (Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>)

January 4 (7 messages)

Re: [PATCHv4 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces (Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) <maheshb@...gle.com>)
[PATCH v5] leaking_addresses: add generic 32-bit support (kaiwan.billimoria@...il.com)
[PATCH] arm: Always use REFCOUNT_FULL (Jinbum Park <jinb.park7@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH] arm: Always use REFCOUNT_FULL (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] arm: Always use REFCOUNT_FULL (Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH] arm: Always use REFCOUNT_FULL (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] arm: Always use REFCOUNT_FULL (Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>)

January 5 (4 messages)

Re: [PATCH v5] leaking_addresses: add generic 32-bit support (kaiwan.billimoria@...il.com)
[PATCH v2] arm: Always use REFCOUNT_FULL (Jinbum Park <jinb.park7@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5] leaking_addresses: add generic 32-bit support ("Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>)
[PATCH] leaking_addresses: add files to skip ("Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>)

January 6 (2 messages)

Re: [PATCH] leaking_addresses: add files to skip (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH] leaking_addresses: add files to skip ("Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>)

January 8 (9 messages)

Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces (James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>)
Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces ("Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>)
Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces (James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>)
Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces ("Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>)
Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces (Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) <maheshb@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces ("Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>)
Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces (Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) <maheshb@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces ("Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>)
Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces (Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) <maheshb@...gle.com>)

January 9 (42 messages)

[PATCH 2/3] exec: Introduce finalize_exec() before start_thread() (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 0/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 1/3] exec: Pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 3/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 03/36] lkdtm/usercopy: Adjust test to include an offset to check reporting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v4 00/36] Hardened usercopy whitelisting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 02/36] usercopy: Include offset in overflow report (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 01/36] usercopy: Remove pointer from overflow report (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 15/36] orangefs: Define usercopy region in orangefs_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 16/36] ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 13/36] befs: Define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 14/36] exofs: Define usercopy region in exofs_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 18/36] cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 20/36] net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 22/36] caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 17/36] vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 19/36] scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 24/36] sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 27/36] fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 26/36] fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 23/36] sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 31/36] arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 28/36] fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 25/36] net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 32/36] kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 29/36] x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 36/36] lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 30/36] arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 21/36] ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 05/36] usercopy: WARN() on slab cache usercopy region violations (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 33/36] kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 09/36] vfs: Copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user() (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 10/36] ext4: Define usercopy region in ext4_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 08/36] vfs: Define usercopy region in names_cache slab caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 11/36] ext2: Define usercopy region in ext2_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 12/36] jfs: Define usercopy region in jfs_ip slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 07/36] dcache: Define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 06/36] usercopy: Mark kmalloc caches as usercopy caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 35/36] usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 34/36] usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelists (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces ("Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>)

January 10 (8 messages)

Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces (Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) <maheshb@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH 13/36] befs: Define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache slab cache (Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 02/36] usercopy: Include offset in overflow report (Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting (Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH 05/36] usercopy: WARN() on slab cache usercopy region violations (Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH 05/36] usercopy: WARN() on slab cache usercopy region violations (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 02/36] usercopy: Include offset in overflow report (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

January 11 (47 messages)

[PATCH 04/38] lkdtm/usercopy: Adjust test to include an offset to check reporting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 05/38] stddef.h: Introduce sizeof_field() (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 02/38] usercopy: Enhance and rename report_usercopy() (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 01/38] usercopy: Remove pointer from overflow report (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 03/38] usercopy: Include offset in hardened usercopy report (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 08/38] usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelists (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v5 00/38] Hardened usercopy whitelisting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 06/38] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 10/38] dcache: Define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 09/38] usercopy: Mark kmalloc caches as usercopy caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 07/38] usercopy: WARN() on slab cache usercopy region violations (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 11/38] vfs: Define usercopy region in names_cache slab caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 12/38] vfs: Copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user() (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 14/38] ext2: Define usercopy region in ext2_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 13/38] ext4: Define usercopy region in ext4_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 15/38] jfs: Define usercopy region in jfs_ip slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 34/38] arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 24/38] ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 19/38] ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 20/38] vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 21/38] cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 22/38] scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 23/38] net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 25/38] caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 36/38] kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 17/38] exofs: Define usercopy region in exofs_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 26/38] sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 37/38] usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 32/38] x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 31/38] fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 27/38] sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 29/38] fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 18/38] orangefs: Define usercopy region in orangefs_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 28/38] net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 30/38] fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 35/38] kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 38/38] lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 33/38] arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 16/38] befs: Define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 34/38] arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy (Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH 02/38] usercopy: Enhance and rename report_usercopy() (Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH 13/38] ext4: Define usercopy region in ext4_inode_cache slab cache (Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>)
[RESEND PATCH v2 0/2] mm: genalloc - track beginning of allocations (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 1/2] genalloc: track beginning of allocations (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 2/2] genalloc: selftest (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH 13/38] ext4: Define usercopy region in ext4_inode_cache slab cache (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 34/38] arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

January 12 (54 messages)

Re: [PATCH v2 08/19] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 04/19] x86: implement ifence() (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
Re: [PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
Re: [PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows (Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH v2 01/19] Documentation: document array_ptr (Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>)
[PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 01/19] Documentation: document array_ptr (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 02/19] arm64: implement ifence_array_ptr() (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 03/19] arm: implement ifence_array_ptr() (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 05/19] x86: implement ifence_array_ptr() and array_ptr_mask() (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 04/19] x86: implement ifence() (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 08/19] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 09/19] ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 11/19] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 12/19] userns: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 13/19] udf: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 14/19] [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 15/19] carl9170: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 16/19] p54: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 18/19] cw1200: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v2 19/19] net: mpls: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 04/19] x86: implement ifence() (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 08/19] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>)
[PATCH RFC v7 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
[PATCH RFC v7 1/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
[PATCH RFC v7 2/6] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
[PATCH RFC v7 3/6] x86/entry: Erase kernel stack in syscall_trace_enter() (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
[PATCH RFC v7 4/6] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
[PATCH RFC v7 5/6] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
[PATCH RFC v7 6/6] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
RE: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting (David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>)
RE: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting (Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 15/19] carl9170: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 15/19] carl9170: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 15/19] carl9170: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 15/19] carl9170: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)

January 13 (27 messages)

Re: [PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5] leaking_addresses: add generic 32-bit support (Kaiwan N Billimoria <kaiwan.billimoria@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Tony Luck <tony.luck@...il.com>)
[PATCH v3 0/9] core, x86: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v3 3/9] arm: implement ifence_array_ptr() (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v3 1/9] Documentation: document array_ptr (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v3 2/9] arm64: implement ifence_array_ptr() (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v3 4/9] x86: implement ifence() (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v3 5/9] x86: implement ifence_array_ptr() and array_ptr_mask() (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v3 7/9] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v3 6/9] asm/nospec: mask speculative execution flows (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v3 9/9] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
Re: [PATCH v5] leaking_addresses: add generic 32-bit support ("Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>)
[PATCHv2 0/7] RFC: Public key encryption of dmesg by the kernel (Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>)
[PATCHv2 1/7] crypto: fix memory leak in rsa-kcs1pad encryption (Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>)
[PATCHv2 2/7] Move net/ceph/armor to lib/ and add docs (Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>)
[PATCHv2 3/7] base64-armor: add bounds checking (Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>)
[PATCHv2 4/7] certs: allow in-kernel access of trusted keys (Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>)
[PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption (Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>)
[PATCHv2 6/7] tools: add dmesg decryption program (Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>)
[PATCHv2 7/7] docs: add dmesg encryption doc (Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>)

January 14 (5 messages)

Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption (Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>)
Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption (Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 02/38] usercopy: Enhance and rename report_usercopy() (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 13/38] ext4: Define usercopy region in ext4_inode_cache slab cache (Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>)
Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting (Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>)

January 15 (8 messages)

Re: [PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows (Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>)
Re: [PATCHv2 4/7] certs: allow in-kernel access of trusted keys (David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 13/19] udf: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>)
Re: [PATCH 33/38] arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy (Dave P Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>)
Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption (Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 13/19] udf: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v7 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 33/38] arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

January 16 (14 messages)

Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption (Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 33/38] arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy (Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>)
kmem_cache_attr (was Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting) (Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>)
Re: kmem_cache_attr (was Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting) (Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>)
Re: kmem_cache_attr (was Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting) (Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>)
Re: kmem_cache_attr (was Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting) (Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>)
Re: kmem_cache_attr (was Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting) (Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>)
Re: kmem_cache_attr (was Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting) (Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Tony Luck <tony.luck@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 01/19] Documentation: document array_ptr (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: kmem_cache_attr (was Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting) (Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)

January 17 (20 messages)

Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH] fork: Allow stack to be wiped on fork (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH] fork: Allow stack to be wiped on fork (Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>)
RE: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v7 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>)
Re: kmem_cache_attr (was Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting) (Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption (Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>)
Re: kmem_cache_attr (was Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting) (Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: kmem_cache_attr (was Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting) (Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)

January 18 (19 messages)

[RFC][PATCH] get rid of the use of set_fs() (by way of kernel_recvmsg()) in sunrpc (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [RFC][PATCH] get rid of the use of set_fs() (by way of kernel_recvmsg()) in sunrpc (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [RFC][PATCH] get rid of the use of set_fs() (by way of kernel_recvmsg()) in sunrpc (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v7 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>)
Re: [RFC][PATCH] get rid of the use of set_fs() (by way of kernel_recvmsg()) in sunrpc (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [RFC][PATCH] get rid of the use of set_fs() (by way of kernel_recvmsg()) in sunrpc (Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths (Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>)
Re: [RFC][PATCH] get rid of the use of set_fs() (by way of kernel_recvmsg()) in sunrpc (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [RFC][PATCH] get rid of the use of set_fs() (by way of kernel_recvmsg()) in sunrpc (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v7 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 27/38] sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH 27/38] sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@...asonboard.com>)
Re: [PATCH 0/5] RFC: Public key encryption of dmesg by the kernel (Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>)

January 19 (22 messages)

[PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4 03/10] x86: implement array_ptr_mask() (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4 04/10] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4 05/10] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4 08/10] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [RFC][PATCH] get rid of the use of set_fs() (by way of kernel_recvmsg()) in sunrpc (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation (Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Adam Sampson <ats@...og.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH] fork: Allow stack to be wiped on fork (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH 0/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

January 20 (19 messages)

Re: kmem_cache_attr (was Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting) (Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH 0/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec (David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v7 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>)
[GIT PULL] spectre variant1 mitigations for 4.16 ("Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [GIT PULL] spectre variant1 mitigations for 4.16 (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)
[PATCH v4.1 00/10] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4.1 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4.1 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4.1 03/10] x86: implement array_ptr_mask() (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4.1 04/10] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4.1 05/10] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4.1 08/10] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4.1 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4.1 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4.1 09/10] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v4.1 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)

January 21 (9 messages)

Re: Re: [PATCH 0/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params (Johannes Berg <johannes@...solutions.net>)
Re: [PATCH v4.1 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4.1 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4.1 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v4.1 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4.1 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4.1 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4.1 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)

January 22 (10 messages)

Re: Re: [PATCH v4.1 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4.1 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4.1 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v4.1 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation (Samuel Neves <samuel.c.p.neves@...il.com>)
[PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4.1 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4.1 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4.1 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4.1 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)

January 23 (4 messages)

Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4.1 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>)
Write-once memory (Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>)

January 24 (13 messages)

Re: Write-once memory (Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation (Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>)
Re: [GIT PULL] spectre variant1 mitigations for 4.16 (Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>)
[RFC PATCH v11 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 6/6] Pmalloc: self-test (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: Write-once memory (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
Re: [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc (Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@...dia.com>)

January 25 (23 messages)

Re: [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@...x.com>)
Re: [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH] cpu: do not leak vulnerabilities to unprivileged users ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH] cpu: do not leak vulnerabilities to unprivileged users (Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>)
Re: Re: [PATCH] cpu: do not leak vulnerabilities to unprivileged users ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH RFC v7 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it (Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>)
Re: [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory (Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>)
Re: [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory (Jerome Glisse <jglisse@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)

January 26 (21 messages)

Re: [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory (Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>)
A problem met when using crash with randomized kernel (Cao jin <caoj.fnst@...fujitsu.com>)
RE: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>)
Re: [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH v2] cpu: do not leak vulnerabilities to unprivileged users ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory (Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2] cpu: do not leak vulnerabilities to unprivileged users (Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2] cpu: do not leak vulnerabilities to unprivileged users (Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2] cpu: do not leak vulnerabilities to unprivileged users ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2] cpu: do not leak vulnerabilities to unprivileged users (Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH v2] cpu: do not leak vulnerabilities to unprivileged users (Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)

January 27 (17 messages)

[PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v5 01/12] Documentation: document array_idx (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v5 04/12] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v5 03/12] x86: implement array_idx_mask (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v5 05/12] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v5 06/12] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v5 07/12] x86: remove the syscall_64 fast-path (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v5 08/12] x86: sanitize sycall table de-references under speculation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v5 09/12] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v5 10/12] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v5 11/12] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v5 12/12] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH] fork: Allow stack to be wiped on fork (Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH] fork: Allow stack to be wiped on fork (Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)

January 28 (26 messages)

Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 03/12] x86: implement array_idx_mask (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 04/12] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 04/12] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 05/12] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 06/12] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 07/12] x86: remove the syscall_64 fast-path (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 08/12] x86: sanitize sycall table de-references under speculation (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)
Re: [PATCH v5 07/12] x86: remove the syscall_64 fast-path (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)
[PATCH 3/3] syscalls: Add a bit of documentation to __SYSCALL_DEFINE (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH 0/3] x86/pti-ish syscall cleanups (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH 1/3] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH 2/3] x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 2/3] x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] syscalls: Add a bit of documentation to __SYSCALL_DEFINE (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH 2/3] x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] syscalls: Add a bit of documentation to __SYSCALL_DEFINE (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] syscalls: Add a bit of documentation to __SYSCALL_DEFINE (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] syscalls: Add a bit of documentation to __SYSCALL_DEFINE (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] syscalls: Add a bit of documentation to __SYSCALL_DEFINE (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)

January 29 (8 messages)

[PATCH] leaking_addresses: add 32-bit support ("Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] syscalls: Add a bit of documentation to __SYSCALL_DEFINE (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>)
RE: [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on (David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>)
list name prefix (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 04/12] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)

January 30 (31 messages)

[PATCH v6 00/13] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v6 01/13] Documentation: document array_index_nospec (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v6 02/13] array_index_nospec: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v6 03/13] x86: implement array_index_mask_nospec (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v6 05/13] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v6 06/13] x86, usercopy: replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v6 04/13] x86: introduce barrier_nospec (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v6 07/13] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v6 08/13] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v6 09/13] x86: sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v6 10/13] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v6 11/13] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v6 12/13] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH v6 13/13] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH] leaking_addresses: add 32-bit support (kaiwan.billimoria@...il.com)
Re: [PATCH] leaking_addresses: add 32-bit support ("Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>)
Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 04/12] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[LSF/MM TOPIC] Protectable Dynamically allocated Memory for both kernel and userspace (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[RFC PATCH v12 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
[PATCH 6/6] Pmalloc: self-test (Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>)
Re: [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc (Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>)
Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
RE: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references ("Van De Ven, Arjan" <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>)

January 31 (9 messages)

Re: [PATCH v6 11/13] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
[PATCH] kbuild/gcc-plugin: drop randomize_layout_hash.h from targets (Cao jin <caoj.fnst@...fujitsu.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 11/13] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)
Re: [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 11/13] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation (Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>)
RE: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references ("Van De Ven, Arjan" <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>)
Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references (Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 11/13] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)

493 messages

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