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Message-ID: <20171208114431.tzteuiovgnn53t5r@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 12:44:31 +0100
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v6 1/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel
stack at the end of syscalls
On Wed, Dec 06, 2017 at 02:33:42AM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote:
> The STACKLEAK feature erases the kernel stack before returning from
> syscalls. That reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
> reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks. Moreover,
> STACKLEAK provides runtime checks for kernel stack overflow detection.
>
> This commit introduces the architecture-specific code filling the used
> part of the kernel stack with a poison value before returning to the
> userspace. Full STACKLEAK feature also contains the gcc plugin which
> comes in a separate commit.
Have you looked at the entry rework in this series:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204140706.296109558@linutronix.de
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