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Message-ID: <20171205204402.GD11064@eros>
Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2017 07:44:02 +1100
From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
To: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, "Roberts,
William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>, Ian Campbell <ijc@...lion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
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Chris Fries <cfries@...gle.com>, Dave Weinstein <olorin@...gle.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@...entembedded.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V11 3/5] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
On Tue, Dec 05, 2017 at 09:20:57PM +0100, Geert Uytterhoeven wrote:
> Hi Tobin,
>
> On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 3:05 AM, Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc> wrote:
> > Currently there exist approximately 14 000 places in the kernel where
> > addresses are being printed using an unadorned %p. This potentially
> > leaks sensitive information regarding the Kernel layout in memory. Many
> > of these calls are stale, instead of fixing every call lets hash the
> > address by default before printing. This will of course break some
> > users, forcing code printing needed addresses to be updated.
> >
> > Code that _really_ needs the address will soon be able to use the new
> > printk specifier %px to print the address.
>
> > --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> > +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
>
> > +/* Maps a pointer to a 32 bit unique identifier. */
> > +static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long hashval;
> > + const int default_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
> > +
> > + if (unlikely(!have_filled_random_ptr_key)) {
> > + spec.field_width = default_width;
> > + /* string length must be less than default_width */
> > + return string(buf, end, "(ptrval)", spec);
> > + }
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
> > + hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u64((u64)ptr, &ptr_key);
> > + /*
> > + * Mask off the first 32 bits, this makes explicit that we have
> > + * modified the address (and 32 bits is plenty for a unique ID).
> > + */
> > + hashval = hashval & 0xffffffff;
> > +#else
> > + hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u32((u32)ptr, &ptr_key);
> > +#endif
>
> Would it make sense to keep the 3 lowest bits of the address?
>
> Currently printed pointers no longer have any correlation with the actual
> alignment in memory of the object, which is a typical cause of a class of bugs.
We'd have to keep the lowest 4 since we are printing in hex, right? This
is easy enough to add. I wasn't the architect behind the hashing but I
can do up a patch and see if anyone who knows crypto objects.
thanks,
Tobin.
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