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Message-Id: <20171129152107.a5c4dd2e20295f817d94f8d9@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 15:21:07 -0800
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Paolo
Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>, Tejun Heo
<tj@...nel.org>, Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>, Greg KH
<gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>, Joe Perches
<joe@...ches.com>, Ian Campbell <ijc@...lion.org.uk>, Sergey Senozhatsky
<sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <wilal.deacon@....com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Chris Fries <cfries@...gle.com>, Dave Weinstein <olorin@...gle.com>, Daniel
Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>, Radim
Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, Stephen Rothwell
<sfr@...b.auug.org.au>, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V11 3/5] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
On Wed, 29 Nov 2017 13:05:03 +1100 "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc> wrote:
> Currently there exist approximately 14 000 places in the kernel where
> addresses are being printed using an unadorned %p. This potentially
> leaks sensitive information regarding the Kernel layout in memory. Many
> of these calls are stale, instead of fixing every call lets hash the
> address by default before printing. This will of course break some
> users, forcing code printing needed addresses to be updated.
>
> Code that _really_ needs the address will soon be able to use the new
> printk specifier %px to print the address.
>
> For what it's worth, usage of unadorned %p can be broken down as
> follows (thanks to Joe Perches).
>
> $ git grep -E '%p[^A-Za-z0-9]' | cut -f1 -d"/" | sort | uniq -c
> 1084 arch
> 20 block
> 10 crypto
> 32 Documentation
> 8121 drivers
> 1221 fs
> 143 include
> 101 kernel
> 69 lib
> 100 mm
> 1510 net
> 40 samples
> 7 scripts
> 11 security
> 166 sound
> 152 tools
> 2 virt
>
> Add function ptr_to_id() to map an address to a 32 bit unique
> identifier. Hash any unadorned usage of specifier %p and any malformed
> specifiers.
>
> ...
>
> @@ -1644,6 +1646,73 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
> return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
> }
>
> +static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key __read_mostly;
> +static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
> +
> +static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
> +{
> + get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
> + /*
> + * have_filled_random_ptr_key==true is dependent on get_random_bytes().
> + * ptr_to_id() needs to see have_filled_random_ptr_key==true
> + * after get_random_bytes() returns.
> + */
> + smp_mb();
> + WRITE_ONCE(have_filled_random_ptr_key, true);
> +}
I don't think I'm seeing anything which prevents two CPUs from
initializing ptr_key at the same time. Probably doesn't matter much...
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