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Message-ID: <CAF2d9ji5WVUjKSnmy+PFw+Ee9hMNXNPssLONLVxt6HDM1dSeOA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2017 13:30:56 +0900
From: Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) <maheshb@...gle.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...onical.com>,
Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Mahesh Bandewar <mahesh@...dewar.net>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Kernel-hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH resend 2/2] userns: control
capabilities of some user namespaces
On Fri, Nov 10, 2017 at 6:58 AM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
> "Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)" <maheshb@...gle.com> writes:
>
>> [resend response as earlier one failed because of formatting issues]
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 9, 2017 at 12:21 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 09, 2017 at 09:55:41AM +0900, Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) wrote:
>>> > On Thu, Nov 9, 2017 at 4:02 AM, Christian Brauner
>>> > <christian.brauner@...onical.com> wrote:
>>> > > On Wed, Nov 08, 2017 at 03:09:59AM -0800, Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) wrote:
>>> > >> Sorry folks I was traveling and seems like lot happened on this thread. :p
>>> > >>
>>> > >> I will try to response few of these comments selectively -
>>> > >>
>>> > >> > The thing that makes me hesitate with this set is that it is a
>>> > >> > permanent new feature to address what (I hope) is a temporary
>>> > >> > problem.
>>> > >> I agree this is permanent new feature but it's not solving a temporary
>>> > >> problem. It's impossible to assess what and when new vulnerability
>>> > >> that could show up. I think Daniel summed it up appropriately in his
>>> > >> response
>>> > >>
>>> > >> > Seems like there are two naive ways to do it, the first being to just
>>> > >> > look at all code under ns_capable() plus code called from there. It
>>> > >> > seems like looking at the result of that could be fruitful.
>>> > >> This is really hard. The main issue that there were features designed
>>> > >> and developed before user-ns days with an assumption that unprivileged
>>> > >> users will never get certain capabilities which only root user gets.
>>> > >> Now that is not true anymore with user-ns creation with mapping root
>>> > >> for any process. Also at the same time blocking user-ns creation for
>>> > >> eveyone is a big-hammer which is not needed too. So it's not that easy
>>> > >> to just perform a code-walk-though and correct those decisions now.
>>> > >>
>>> > >> > It seems to me that the existing control in
>>> > >> > /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone might be the better duct tape
>>> > >> > in that case.
>>> > >> This solution is essentially blocking unprivileged users from using
>>> > >> the user-namespaces entirely. This is not really a solution that can
>>> > >> work. The solution that this patch-set adds allows unprivileged users
>>> > >> to create user-namespaces. Actually the proposed solution is more
>>> > >> fine-grained approach than the unprivileged_userns_clone solution
>>> > >> since you can selectively block capabilities rather than completely
>>> > >> blocking the functionality.
>>> > >
>>> > > I've been talking to Stéphane today about this and we should also keep in mind
>>> > > that we have:
>>> > >
>>> > > chb@...ventiont|~
>>> > >> ls -al /proc/sys/user/
>>> > > total 0
>>> > > dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Nov 6 23:32 .
>>> > > dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Nov 2 22:13 ..
>>> > > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_cgroup_namespaces
>>> > > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_inotify_instances
>>> > > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_inotify_watches
>>> > > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_ipc_namespaces
>>> > > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_mnt_namespaces
>>> > > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_net_namespaces
>>> > > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_pid_namespaces
>>> > > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_user_namespaces
>>> > > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_uts_namespaces
>>> > >
>>> > > These files allow you to limit the number of namespaces that can be created
>>> > > *per namespace* type. So let's say your system runs a bunch of user namespaces
>>> > > you can do:
>>> > >
>>> > > chb@...ventiont|~
>>> > >> echo 0 > /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces
>>> > >
>>> > > So that the next time you try to create a user namespaces you'd see:
>>> > >
>>> > > chb@...ventiont|~
>>> > >> unshare -U
>>> > > unshare: unshare failed: No space left on device
>>> > >
>>> > > So there's not even a need to upstream a new sysctl since we have ways of
>>> > > blocking this.
>>> > >
>>> > I'm not sure how it's solving the problem that my patch-set is addressing?
>>> > I agree though that the need for unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl goes
>>> > away as this is equivalent to setting that sysctl to 0 as you have
>>> > described above.
>>>
>>> oh right that was the reasoning iirc for not needing the other sysctl.
>>>
>>> > However as I mentioned earlier, blocking processes from creating
>>> > user-namespaces is not the solution. Processes should be able to
>>> > create namespaces as they are designed but at the same time we need to
>>> > have controls to 'contain' them if a need arise. Setting max_no to 0
>>> > is not the solution that I'm looking for since it doesn't solve the
>>> > problem.
>>>
>>> well yesterday we were told that was explicitly not the goal, but that was
>>> not by you ... i just mention it to explain why we seem to be walking in
>>> circles a bit.
>>>
>>> anyway the bounding set doesn't actually make sense so forget that. the
>>> question then is just whether it makes sense to allow things to continue
>>> at all in this situation. would you mind indulging me by giving one or two
>>> concrete examples in the previous known cves of what capabilities you would
>>> have dropped tto allow the rest to continue to be safely used?
>>>
>> Of course. Let's take an example of the CVE that I have mentioned in
>> my cover-letter -
>> CVE-2017-7308(https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7308).
>> It's well documented and even has a
>> exploit(https://github.com/xairy/kernel-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2017-7308)
>> c-program that can demonstrate how it can be used against non-patched
>> kernel. There is very nice blog
>> post(https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.kr/2017/05/exploiting-linux-kernel-via-packet.html)
>> about this vulnerability by Andrey Konovalov.
>>
>> This is about the AF_PACKET socket interface that is protected behind
>> NET_RAW capability. This capability is not available to unprivileged
>> user. However, any unprivileged user can get NET_RAW capability (as
>> demonstrated in the cover-letter code that I have attached in this
>> patch series) so this NET_RAW capability is available to any
>> unprivileged user on the host if the kernel has user-namespaces
>> available.
>>
>> With this patch-set applied, all that is needed is to flip a bit with
>> the sysctl (kernel.controlled_userns_caps_whitelist) as demonstrated
>> below -
>>
>> root@...h6:~# uname -a
>> Linux lphh6 4.14.0-smp-DEV #97 SMP @1510203579 x86_64 GNU/Linux
>> root@...h6:~# sysctl -q kernel.controlled_userns_caps_whitelist
>> kernel.controlled_userns_caps_whitelist = 1f,ffffffff
>>
>> Now when I run the program (demo from the cover-letter) as a normal
>> unprivileged user I can't create a RAW socket in init-ns but I can in
>> the child-ns.
>>
>> dumbo@...h6:~$ /tmp/acquire_raw
>> Attempting to open RAW socket before unshare()...
>> socket() SOCK_RAW failed: : Operation not permitted
>> Attempting to open RAW socket after unshare()...
>> Successfully opened RAW-Sock after unshare().
>> dumbo@...h6:~$
>>
>> Now as a root user. Take off CAP_NET_RAW
>>
>> root@...h6:~# sysctl -w kernel.controlled_userns_caps_whitelist=1f,ffffdfff
>> kernel.controlled_userns_caps_whitelist = 1f,ffffdfff
>> root@...h6:~#
>>
>> Now run the same program as an unprivileged user -
>>
>> dumbo@...h6:~$ /tmp/acquire_raw
>> Attempting to open RAW socket before unshare()...
>> socket() SOCK_RAW failed: : Operation not permitted
>> Attempting to open RAW socket after unshare()...
>> socket() SOCK_RAW failed: : Operation not permitted
>> dumbo@...h6:~$
>>
>> Notice that it has failed to create a raw socket in init and in child
>> namespace. It's not blocking creation of user-namespaces but allowing
>> admin turn individual capability bits on and off.
>>
>> This is very simplistic example of just demonstrating how capability
>> bits turn-on/off works. So let's assume a sandboxed environment where
>> we don't know what a binary that we are about run in an environment
>> which is identified as susceptible. By turning off the NET_RAW bit,
>> the admin gets an assurance that system is safe and if binary fails
>> because it's not getting this capability then that bad but a sad
>> consequence (without compromising the host integrity) but if it
>> doesn't use the NET_RAW capability but any other combination of
>> remaining 36 capabilities, it would get whatever is necessary. This
>> means we can safely allow processes to create user-namespaces by
>> taking off certain capabilities in question for temporary/extended
>> period until proper fix is applied without compromising the system
>> integrity. The impact will vary based on which capability is taken off
>> and admin would / should be ware of for the environment that he/she is
>> dealing with.
>
> My challenge with this reasoning is that I don't know that it meanifully
> generalizes to any other capability.
>
> I can in the sandbox today create a user namespace and then set
> max_net_namespaces to 0, and drop CAP_NET_RAW and that blocks
> the attack. (Possibly with a little spice to prevent a suid root
> program from reacquiring CAP_NET_RAW).
>
This is problematic since you are expecting the user-namespace creator
to perform this operation and then block the child process from
creating the user-namespace. This is similar to making user-namespace
creation a privileged operation discussed previously.
> So while your solution doesn't look horrible especially if it can be
> done at a user namespace level so the restrictions can be limited to a
> single sandbox. I am not at all certain that the capabilities is the
> proper place to limit code reachability.
>
> I would very much like to see which capabilities that are available with
> ns_capable, are more meaningful to limit than just dropping the
> capability during sandbox creation and denying the creation of the
> corresponding namespace.
>
The primary assumption in this approach is that we can drop
capabilities before running the workload and then not allowing
workload to create the user-namespace. This does not work for cases
where workload needs to create user-namespaces.
> CAP_NET_RAW is one. Are there any other capabilities that are
> meanginful to limit?
>
There are currently 37 capabilities and I see many of those are
currently namespace aware (with ns_capable() call). Also there seems
to be disproportionate amount of capable() to ns_capable() calls. This
could be a result of not every feature available kernel-wide being
namespace aware/capable etc. and this will evolve and mature i.e.
ns_capable() will continue to grow where this would be applicable.
Also Probably I'm the wrong person to ask this question to since I
understand networking more than anything else. However, the main point
is that we cannot predict which vulnerability is going to get
published tomorrow networking or non-networking, so having a tool that
gives controls to admin while allowing user-namespace creation is
super useful.
thanks,
--mahesh..
> Eric
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