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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+6Q+=2NoXmDJPO3wWGH8nDkHuGujKVgH6fb8cqkHq7WQ@mail.gmail.com> Date: Fri, 3 Nov 2017 18:39:32 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86: Allow paranoid __{get,put}_user On Fri, Nov 3, 2017 at 5:24 PM, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk> wrote: > On Fri, Nov 03, 2017 at 05:14:05PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: >> > x86 turns out to be easier since the safe and unsafe paths are mostly >> > disjoint so we don't have to worry about gcc optimizing out access_ok. >> > I tweaked the Kconfig to someting a bit more generic. >> > >> > The size increase was ~8K in text with a config I tested. >> >> Specifically, this feature would have caught the waitid() bug in 4.13 >> immediately. > > You mean, as soon as waitid() was given a kernel address. At which point > you'd get a shiny way to generate a BUG(), and if something like that > happened under a mutex - it's even more fun... Nope, any usage at all would BUG. This would have been immediately noticed. :) -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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