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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+eb+41XRorgAVURKEsixiMYgtcmpKwQzJ3Mct_yw1G6Q@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2017 15:28:29 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] arm64: optional paranoid __{get,put}_user checks On Wed, Nov 1, 2017 at 2:13 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> wrote: > On 11/01/2017 05:05 AM, Mark Rutland wrote: >> On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 04:56:39PM -0700, Laura Abbott wrote: >>> On 10/26/2017 02:09 AM, Mark Rutland wrote: >>>> In Prague, Kees mentioned that it would be nice to have a mechanism to >>>> catch bad __{get,put}_user uses, such as the recent CVE-2017-5123 [1,2] >>>> issue with unsafe_put_user() in waitid(). >>>> >>>> These patches allow an optional access_ok() check to be dropped in >>>> arm64's __{get,put}_user() primitives. These will then BUG() if a bad >>>> user pointer is passed (which should only happen in the absence of an >>>> earlier access_ok() check). >> >>> Turning on the option fails as soon as we hit userspace. On my buildroot >>> based environment I get the help text for ld.so (????) and then a message >>> about attempting to kill init. >> >> Ouch. Thanks for the report, and sorry about this. >> >> The problem is that I evaluate the ptr argument twice in >> __{get,put}_user(), and this may have side effects. >> >> e.g. when the ELF loader does things like: >> >> __put_user((elf_addr_t)p, sp++) >> >> ... we increment sp twice, and write to the wrong user address, leaving >> sp corrupt. >> >> I have an additional patch [1] to fix this, which is in my >> arm64/access-ok branch [2]. >> >> Thanks, >> Mark. >> >> [1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mark/linux.git/commit/?h=arm64/access-ok&id=ebb7ff83eb53b8810395d5cf48712a4ae6d678543 >> [2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mark/linux.git/log/?h=arm64/access-ok >> > > Thanks, the updated patch works. I wrote an LKDTM test to verify > the expected behavior (__{get,put}_user panic whereas {get,put}_user > do not). You're welcome to add Tested-by or I can wait for v2. Nice. :) Out of curiosity, can you check if this correctly BUG()s on a waitid() call when the fixes are reverted? 96ca579a1ecc ("waitid(): Avoid unbalanced user_access_end() on access_ok() error") 1c9fec470b81 ("waitid(): Add missing access_ok() checks") -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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