[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20171027154113.GA13737@arm.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 16:41:13 +0100
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] arm64: optional paranoid __{get,put}_user checks
On Thu, Oct 26, 2017 at 10:09:40AM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> Hi,
>
> In Prague, Kees mentioned that it would be nice to have a mechanism to
> catch bad __{get,put}_user uses, such as the recent CVE-2017-5123 [1,2]
> issue with unsafe_put_user() in waitid().
>
> These patches allow an optional access_ok() check to be dropped in
> arm64's __{get,put}_user() primitives. These will then BUG() if a bad
> user pointer is passed (which should only happen in the absence of an
> earlier access_ok() check).
>
> The first patch rewrites the arm64 access_ok() check in C. This gives
> the compiler the visibility it needs to elide redundant access_ok()
> checks, so in the common case:
>
> get_user()
> access_ok()
> __get_user()
> BUG_ON(!access_ok())
> <uaccess asm>
>
> ... the compiler can determine that the second access_ok() must return
> true, and can elide it along with the BUG_ON(), leaving:
>
> get_user()
> access_ok()
> __get_user()
> <uaccess asm>
>
> ... and thus this sanity check can have no cost in the common case.
Probably a stupid question, but why not just move the access_ok check
into __{get,put}_user and remove it from {get,put}_user? We can also
then move the uaccess_{enable,disable}_not_uao calls out from the __
variants so that we can implement user_access_{begin,end}.
Will
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
