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Message-Id: <1508986436-31966-3-git-send-email-me@tobin.cc>
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2017 13:53:56 +1100
From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@...lion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <wilal.deacon@....com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Chris Fries <cfries@...gle.com>,
Dave Weinstein <olorin@...gle.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH V8 2/2] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
%pK allowing some control via the kptr_restrict sysctl. Exposing addresses
gives attackers sensitive information about the kernel layout in memory.
We can reduce the attack surface by hashing all addresses printed with
%p. This will of course break some users, forcing code printing needed
addresses to be updated.
For what it's worth, usage of unadorned %p can be broken down as
follows (thanks to Joe Perches).
$ git grep -E '%p[^A-Za-z0-9]' | cut -f1 -d"/" | sort | uniq -c
1084 arch
20 block
10 crypto
32 Documentation
8121 drivers
1221 fs
143 include
101 kernel
69 lib
100 mm
1510 net
40 samples
7 scripts
11 security
166 sound
152 tools
2 virt
Add function ptr_to_id() to map an address to a 32 bit unique identifier.
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc>
---
lib/vsprintf.c | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 107 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 16a587aed40e..8f4aebd10c7e 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
#include <linux/uuid.h>
#include <linux/of.h>
#include <net/addrconf.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#endif
@@ -1344,6 +1346,57 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,
}
static noinline_for_stack
+char *kernel_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
+ struct printf_spec spec)
+{
+ spec.base = 16;
+ spec.flags |= SMALL;
+ if (spec.field_width == -1) {
+ spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(void *);
+ spec.flags |= ZEROPAD;
+ }
+
+ switch (kptr_restrict) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Always print %pK values */
+ break;
+ case 1: {
+ const struct cred *cred;
+
+ /*
+ * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
+ * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
+ */
+ if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi())
+ return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
+
+ /*
+ * Only print the real pointer value if the current
+ * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
+ * same credentials it started with. This is because
+ * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
+ * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
+ * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
+ * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
+ */
+ cred = current_cred();
+ if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
+ !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
+ !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
+ ptr = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ case 2:
+ default:
+ /* Always print 0's for %pK */
+ ptr = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return number(buf, end, (unsigned long)ptr, spec);
+}
+
+static noinline_for_stack
char *netdev_bits(char *buf, char *end, const void *addr, const char *fmt)
{
unsigned long long num;
@@ -1591,6 +1644,54 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
}
+static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key;
+static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
+
+static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+{
+ get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
+ WRITE_ONCE(have_filled_random_ptr_key, true);
+}
+
+static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+ .func = fill_random_ptr_key
+};
+
+static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
+{
+ int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ return 0;
+ else if (ret == -EALREADY) {
+ fill_random_ptr_key(&random_ready);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+early_initcall(initialize_ptr_random);
+
+/* Maps a pointer to a 32 bit unique identifier. */
+static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)
+{
+ unsigned int hashval;
+ int size = sizeof(hashval);
+
+ if (unlikely(!have_filled_random_ptr_key)) {
+ spec.field_width = 2 + 2 * size; /* 0x + hex */
+ return string(buf, end, "(pointer)", spec);
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+ hashval = (unsigned int)siphash_1u64((u64)ptr, &ptr_key);
+#else
+ hashval = (unsigned int)siphash_1u32((u32)ptr, &ptr_key);
+#endif
+
+ return special_hex_number(buf, end, hashval, size);
+}
+
int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
/*
@@ -1703,13 +1804,14 @@ int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
* Note: The difference between 'S' and 'F' is that on ia64 and ppc64
* function pointers are really function descriptors, which contain a
* pointer to the real address.
+ *
+ * Note: The default behaviour (unadorned %p) is to hash the address,
+ * rendering it useful as a unique identifier.
*/
static noinline_for_stack
char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
struct printf_spec spec)
{
- const int default_width = 2 * sizeof(void *);
-
if (!ptr && *fmt != 'K')
return string(buf, end, "(null)", spec);
@@ -1785,47 +1887,7 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
return buf;
}
case 'K':
- switch (kptr_restrict) {
- case 0:
- /* Always print %pK values */
- break;
- case 1: {
- const struct cred *cred;
-
- /*
- * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
- * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
- */
- if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
- if (spec.field_width == -1)
- spec.field_width = default_width;
- return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
- }
-
- /*
- * Only print the real pointer value if the current
- * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
- * same credentials it started with. This is because
- * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
- * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
- * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
- * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
- */
- cred = current_cred();
- if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
- !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
- !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
- ptr = NULL;
- break;
- }
- case 2:
- default:
- /* Always print 0's for %pK */
- ptr = NULL;
- break;
- }
- break;
-
+ return kernel_pointer(buf, end, ptr, spec);
case 'N':
return netdev_bits(buf, end, ptr, fmt);
case 'a':
@@ -1851,14 +1913,9 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
return device_node_string(buf, end, ptr, spec, fmt + 1);
}
}
- spec.flags |= SMALL;
- if (spec.field_width == -1) {
- spec.field_width = default_width;
- spec.flags |= ZEROPAD;
- }
- spec.base = 16;
- return number(buf, end, (unsigned long) ptr, spec);
+ /* default is to _not_ leak addresses, hash before printing */
+ return ptr_to_id(buf, end, ptr, spec);
}
/*
--
2.7.4
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