[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <AED1D433-EDCE-4B0B-AB8D-55627E5B94A4@belouin.fr>
Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2017 20:41:58 +0200
From: Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@...ouin.fr>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>, linux-cachefs@...hat.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, linux-api@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] security, capabilities: Add CAP_SYS_MOUNT
On October 21, 2017 7:31:24 PM GMT+02:00, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
>On 10/21/2017 6:43 AM, Nicolas Belouin wrote:
>> With CAP_SYS_ADMIN being bloated and inapropriate for actions such
>> as mounting/unmounting filesystems, the creation of a new capability
>> is needed.
>> CAP_SYS_MOUNT is meant to give a process the ability to call for
>mount,
>> umount and umount2 syscalls.
>
>This is increased granularity for it's own sake. There is no
>compelling reason to break out this capability in particular.
Obviously there is a need to break CAP_SYS_ADMIN in pieces, to do so, you have to start somewhere, so I chose to begin with this.
>Can you identify existing use cases where you would have
>CAP_SYS_MOUNT without also having CAP_SYS_ADMIN? I should think
>that all the work that's gone into unprivileged mounts over
>the past couple years would make this unnecessary.
If you look at the udiskd deamon used by most desktop environments, it is launched as root or at least with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Here, you could use CAP_SYS_MOUNT. There might also be a use within containers as you don't want to give CAP_SYS_ADMIN to a container if it just need to mount/unmount filesystems. If you go even further, it could be used to allow swapon/swapoff (maybe in future patch set).
>
>> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@...ouin.fr>
>> ---
>> include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 5 ++++-
>> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
>> 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>> index 230e05d35191..ce230aa6d928 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>> @@ -365,8 +365,11 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
>>
>> #define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37
>>
>> +/* Allow mounting, unmounting filesystems */
>>
>> -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ
>> +#define CAP_SYS_MOUNT 38
>> +
>> +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_MOUNT
>>
>> #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
>b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
>> index 35ffb29a69cb..a873dce97fd5 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
>> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
>> @@ -24,9 +24,9 @@
>> "audit_control", "setfcap"
>>
>> #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
>> - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
>> + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_mount"
>>
>> -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
>> +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_MOUNT
>> #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
>> #endif
>>
Nicolas
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
