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Message-ID: <d3e1c911-138d-082a-b941-651217d0faf8@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2017 10:25:21 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@...ouin.fr>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.com>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>, Chao Yu <yuchao0@...wei.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>, Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@...nel.org>,
Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@...sity.com>, Joel Becker <jlbec@...lplan.org>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>, Phillip Lougher
<phillip@...ashfs.org.uk>, Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@...il.com>,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, James Morris
<james.l.morris@...cle.com>, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mtd@...ts.infradead.org,
jfs-discussion@...ts.sourceforge.net, ocfs2-devel@....oracle.com,
linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org, reiserfs-devel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] security, capabilities: create
CAP_TRUSTED
On 10/21/2017 6:45 AM, Nicolas Belouin wrote:
> with CAP_SYS_ADMIN being bloated, the usefulness of using it to
> flag a process to be entrusted for e.g reading and writing trusted
> xattr is near zero.
> CAP_TRUSTED aims to provide userland with a way to mark a process as
> entrusted to do specific (not specially admin-centered) actions. It
> would for example allow a process to red/write the trusted xattrs.
Please explain how this is different from CAP_MAC_ADMIN in
any existing use case. If it is significantly different, how
would the two interact?
> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@...ouin.fr>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++-
> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 5 +++--
> 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> index ce230aa6d928..27e457b93c84 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> @@ -369,7 +369,11 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
>
> #define CAP_SYS_MOUNT 38
>
> -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_MOUNT
> +/* Allow read/write trusted xattr */
> +
> +#define CAP_TRUSTED 39
> +
> +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_TRUSTED
>
> #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index a873dce97fd5..f5dc8e109f5a 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -24,9 +24,10 @@
> "audit_control", "setfcap"
>
> #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
> - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_mount"
> + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_mount", \
> + "trusted"
>
> -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_MOUNT
> +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_TRUSTED
> #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
> #endif
>
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