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Message-ID: <20171003100433.GA4931@leverpostej>
Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2017 11:04:33 +0100
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>,
Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.com>,
Yoshinori Sato <ysato@...rs.sourceforge.jp>,
Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-sh@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] Makefile: Introduce
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
Hi Kees,
On Mon, Oct 02, 2017 at 12:20:04PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> As described in the final patch:
>
> Nearly all modern compilers support a stack-protector option, and nearly
> all modern distributions enable the kernel stack-protector, so enabling
> this by default in kernel builds would make sense. However, Kconfig does
> not have knowledge of available compiler features, so it isn't safe to
> force on, as this would unconditionally break builds for the compilers
> or architectures that don't have support. Instead, this introduces a new
> option, CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO, which attempts to discover the best
> possible stack-protector available, and will allow builds to proceed even
> if the compiler doesn't support any stack-protector.
>
> This option is made the default so that kernels built with modern
> compilers will be protected-by-default against stack buffer overflows,
> avoiding things like the recent BlueBorne attack. Selection of a specific
> stack-protector option remains available, including disabling it.
I gave this a spin atop of v4.14-rc3 with a few arm64 toolchains I had
installed:
* Linaro 17.08 GCC 7.1 // strong
* Linaro 17.05 GCC 6.1 // strong
* Linaro 15.08 GCC 5.1 // strong
* Linaro 14.09 GCC 4.9 // strong
* Linaro 13.06 GCC 4.8 // none
* Linaro 13.01 GCC 4.7 // none
AFAICT, the detection is correct, and arm64 toolchains only gained stack
protector support in GCC 4.9. I manually tested GCC 4.8 and 4.7, and
got:
warning: -fstack-protector not supported for this target [enabled by default]
... so that looks good to me.
One thing I noticed was taht even when the build system detects no
support for stack-protector, it still passes -DCONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
to the toolchain. Is that expected?
Thanks,
Mark.
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