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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJsA-y1yDre5cQ9j8S4i0ftt=Rk5GaXP8wunmm09rrUNg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2017 20:03:05 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>, Kevin Hao <haokexin@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@...mail.com>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>, Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...gle.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] x86/fpu: prevent leaking FPU registers via invalid
FPU state
On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 5:44 PM, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com> wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
>
> This is a second attempt to fix the bug found by syzkaller where the
> ptrace syscall can be used to set invalid bits in a task's FPU state.
> I also found that an equivalent bug was reachable using the sigreturn
> syscall, so the first patch fixes the bug in both cases.
>
> The other two patches start validating the other parts of the
> xstate_header and make it so that invalid FPU states can no longer be
> abused to leak the FPU registers of other processes.
>
> Eric Biggers (3):
> x86/fpu: don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
> x86/fpu: tighten validation of user-supplied xstate_header
> x86/fpu: reinitialize FPU registers if restoring FPU state fails
This series looks sensible to me! Thanks for getting this fixed up.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
-Kees
>
> arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
> arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
> arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 15 +++++++++++----
> arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 27 ++++++++++-----------------
> 6 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
>
> --
> 2.14.1.690.gbb1197296e-goog
>
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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