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Message-ID: <2545404.XUVGGHhd0i@tauon.chronox.de>
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 15:45:07 +0200
From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>, Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@...il.com>, security@...nel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
Am Mittwoch, 20. September 2017, 12:52:21 CEST schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Hi Jason,
>
> This sounds incorrect to me. Choosing a fresh, random, one-time-use
> 256-bit key and rolling with a zero nonce is a totally legitimate way
> of using GCM. There's no possible reuse of the key stream this way.
> However, on the off chance that you know what you're talking about,
> could you outline the cryptographic attack you have in mind, or if
> that's too difficult, simply link to the relevant paper on eprint?
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/Joux_comments.pdf
Ciao
Stephan
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