|
Message-ID: <20170824025901.cpppy4nn5xv2ao24@ast-mbp> Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 19:59:02 -0700 From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com> To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>, "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>, Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>, Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v7 08/10] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 02:09:31AM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > Add a basic sandbox tool to create a process isolated from some part of > the system. This sandbox create a read-only environment. It is only > allowed to write to a character device such as a TTY: > > # :> X > # echo $? > 0 > # ./samples/bpf/landlock1 /bin/sh -i > Launching a new sandboxed process. > # :> Y > cannot create Y: Operation not permitted > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> ... > +SEC("landlock1") > +static int landlock_fs_prog1(struct landlock_context *ctx) > +{ > + char fmt_error_mode[] = "landlock1: error: get_mode:%lld\n"; > + char fmt_error_access[] = "landlock1: error: access denied\n"; > + long long ret; > + > + /* > + * The argument ctx->arg2 contains bitflags of actions for which the > + * rule is run. The flag LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_WRITE means that a write > + * is requested by one of the userspace processes restricted by this > + * rule. The following test allows any actions which does not include a > + * write. > + */ > + if (!(ctx->arg2 & LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_WRITE)) > + return 0; > + > + /* > + * The argument ctx->arg1 is a file handle for which the process want > + * to access. The function bpf_handle_fs_get_mode() return the mode of > + * a file (e.g. S_IFBLK, S_IFDIR, S_IFREG...). If there is an error, > + * for example if the argument is not a file handle, then an > + * -errno value is returned. Otherwise the caller get the file mode as > + * with stat(2). > + */ > + ret = bpf_handle_fs_get_mode((void *)ctx->arg1); > + if (ret < 0) { > + > + /* > + * The bpf_trace_printk() function enable to write in the > + * kernel eBPF debug log, accessible through > + * /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_pipe . To be allowed to call > + * this function, a Landlock rule must have the > + * LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_ABILITY_DEBUG ability, which is only > + * allowed for CAP_SYS_ADMIN. > + */ > + bpf_trace_printk(fmt_error_mode, sizeof(fmt_error_mode), ret); > + return 1; > + } > + > + /* > + * This check allows the action on the file if it is a directory or a > + * pipe. Otherwise, a message is printed to the eBPF log. > + */ > + if (S_ISCHR(ret) || S_ISFIFO(ret)) > + return 0; > + bpf_trace_printk(fmt_error_access, sizeof(fmt_error_access)); > + return 1; > +} > + > +/* > + * This subtype enable to set the ABI, which ensure that the eBPF context and > + * program behavior will be compatible with this Landlock rule. > + */ > +SEC("subtype") > +static const union bpf_prog_subtype _subtype = { > + .landlock_rule = { > + .abi = 1, > + .event = LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_EVENT_FS, > + .ability = LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_ABILITY_DEBUG, > + } > +}; from rule writer perspective can you somehow merge subtype definition with the program? It seems they go hand in hand. Like section name of the program can be: SEC("landlock_rule1/event=fs/ability=debug") static int landlock_fs_prog1(struct landlock_context *ctx)... and the loader can parse this string and prepare appropriate data structures for the kernel.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.