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Message-ID: <20170817175807.ejgsrfdgojgbtkwf@smitten>
Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 11:58:07 -0600
From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v3 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing
the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
Hi Kees,
Thanks for the review.
On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 03:16:13PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 2:16 PM, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com> wrote:
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>
> I'd like tests to fail if the given config options are missing. That
> way we're always running the same test code, but it's only the kernel
> that is changing. If it's just STACKLEAK_POISON missing, we can just
> #ifndef that and insert it manually here.
Sounds good. It was also for the lowest_stack member of
struct thread_struct, but that wasn't strictly necessary for the test
to work correctly, it just means...
> > + left -= 2 * sizeof(unsigned long);
> > +
> > + /* let's count the number of canaries, not bytes */
> > + left /= sizeof(unsigned long);
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < left; i++) {
> > + if (*(lowest - i) != STACKLEAK_POISON)
> > + continue;
> > +
> > + if (i > 32)
> > + pr_warn_once("More than 256 bytes not canaried?");
>
> Why the _once part here?
...that we should drop this warning, which was mostly a sanity check
during development anyway.
I believe I've addressed the rest as well with the version below.
Cheers,
Tycho
>From 5cae1f904cd3d813628a5b22ca5fe054b5eb7378 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 12:43:07 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] lkdtm: add a test for STACKLEAK plugin
There are two tests here, one to test that the BUG() in check_alloca is hit
correctly, and the other to test that the BUG() in track_stack is hit
correctly.
Ideally we'd also be able to check end-to-end that a syscall results in an
entirely poisoned stack, but I'm not sure how to do a syscall from lkdtm.
v2: * use good comment style
* drop references to lowest_stack, and #define STACKLEAK_POISON if
necessary
* drop unnecessary warning about canary space
* add error messages, make them explicit, and use pr_err()
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>
---
drivers/misc/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/misc/lkdtm.h | 4 ++
drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c | 2 +
drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 140 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/Makefile b/drivers/misc/Makefile
index 81ef3e67acc9..805e4f06011a 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/misc/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_heap.o
lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_perms.o
lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_rodata_objcopy.o
lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_usercopy.o
+lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_stackleak.o
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_lkdtm_rodata.o := n
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
index 3b4976396ec4..3b67cc4a070b 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
@@ -64,4 +64,8 @@ void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM(void);
void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND(void);
void lkdtm_USERCOPY_KERNEL(void);
+/* lkdtm_stackleak.c */
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ALLOCA(void);
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_BIG_FRAME(void);
+
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
index 42d2b8e31e6b..f42b346bdf5c 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM),
CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND),
CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_KERNEL),
+ CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_ALLOCA),
+ CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_BIG_FRAME),
};
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2fa44c641d11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/*
+ * This file tests a few aspects of the stackleak compiler plugin:
+ * - the current task stack somewhere below lowest_stack is properly canaried
+ * - small allocas are allowed properly via check_alloca()
+ * - big allocations that exhaust the stack are BUG()s
+ * - function calls whose stack frames blow the stack are BUG()s
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) Docker, Inc. 2017
+ *
+ * Author: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>
+ */
+
+#include "lkdtm.h"
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+
+/* for security_inode_init_security */
+#include <linux/security.h>
+
+#ifndef STACKLEAK_POISON
+# define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF
+#endif
+
+static bool check_poison(unsigned long *ptr, unsigned long n)
+{
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < n; i++) {
+ if (*(ptr - i) != STACKLEAK_POISON)
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool check_my_stack(void)
+{
+ unsigned long *lowest, left, i;
+
+ lowest = &i;
+ left = (unsigned long) lowest % THREAD_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * See note in arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S about the or; the bottom two
+ * qwords are not
+ */
+ left -= 2 * sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+ /* let's count the number of canaries, not bytes */
+ left /= sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < left; i++) {
+ if (*(lowest - i) != STACKLEAK_POISON)
+ continue;
+
+ if (!check_poison(lowest - i, 16))
+ continue;
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i == left) {
+ pr_warn("didn't find canary?");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (check_poison((unsigned long *) lowest - i, left - i)) {
+ pr_info("current stack poisoned correctly\n");
+ return true;
+ } else {
+ pr_err("current stack not poisoned correctly\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+static noinline void do_alloca(unsigned long size, void (*todo)(void))
+{
+ char buf[size];
+
+ if (todo)
+ todo();
+
+ /* so this doesn't get inlined or optimized out */
+ snprintf(buf, size, "hello world\n");
+}
+
+/* Check the BUG() in check_alloca() */
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ALLOCA(void)
+{
+ unsigned long left = (unsigned long) &left % THREAD_SIZE;
+
+ if (!check_my_stack())
+ return;
+
+ /* try a small allocation to see if it works */
+ do_alloca(16, NULL);
+ pr_info("small allocation successful\n");
+
+
+ pr_info("attempting large alloca of %lu\n", left);
+ do_alloca(left, NULL);
+ pr_err("FAIL: large alloca succeded!\n");
+}
+
+static void use_some_stack(void) {
+
+ /*
+ * Note: this needs to be a(n exported) function that has track_stack
+ * inserted, i.e. it isn't in the various sections restricted by
+ * stackleak_track_stack_gate.
+ */
+ security_inode_init_security(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note that the way this test fails is kind of ugly; it hits the BUG() in
+ * track_stack, but then the BUG() handler blows the stack and hits the stack
+ * guard page.
+ */
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_BIG_FRAME(void)
+{
+ unsigned long left = (unsigned long) &left % THREAD_SIZE;
+
+ if (!check_my_stack())
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * use almost all of the stack up to the padding allowed by track_stack
+ */
+ do_alloca(left - THREAD_SIZE / 16 - 1, use_some_stack);
+ pr_err("FAIL: stack frame should have blown stack!\n");
+}
--
2.11.0
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