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Message-ID: <20170817175807.ejgsrfdgojgbtkwf@smitten> Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 11:58:07 -0600 From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v3 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Hi Kees, Thanks for the review. On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 03:16:13PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 2:16 PM, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com> wrote: > > +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK > > I'd like tests to fail if the given config options are missing. That > way we're always running the same test code, but it's only the kernel > that is changing. If it's just STACKLEAK_POISON missing, we can just > #ifndef that and insert it manually here. Sounds good. It was also for the lowest_stack member of struct thread_struct, but that wasn't strictly necessary for the test to work correctly, it just means... > > + left -= 2 * sizeof(unsigned long); > > + > > + /* let's count the number of canaries, not bytes */ > > + left /= sizeof(unsigned long); > > + > > + for (i = 0; i < left; i++) { > > + if (*(lowest - i) != STACKLEAK_POISON) > > + continue; > > + > > + if (i > 32) > > + pr_warn_once("More than 256 bytes not canaried?"); > > Why the _once part here? ...that we should drop this warning, which was mostly a sanity check during development anyway. I believe I've addressed the rest as well with the version below. Cheers, Tycho >From 5cae1f904cd3d813628a5b22ca5fe054b5eb7378 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com> Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 12:43:07 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] lkdtm: add a test for STACKLEAK plugin There are two tests here, one to test that the BUG() in check_alloca is hit correctly, and the other to test that the BUG() in track_stack is hit correctly. Ideally we'd also be able to check end-to-end that a syscall results in an entirely poisoned stack, but I'm not sure how to do a syscall from lkdtm. v2: * use good comment style * drop references to lowest_stack, and #define STACKLEAK_POISON if necessary * drop unnecessary warning about canary space * add error messages, make them explicit, and use pr_err() Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com> --- drivers/misc/Makefile | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm.h | 4 ++ drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c | 2 + drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 140 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/misc/Makefile b/drivers/misc/Makefile index 81ef3e67acc9..805e4f06011a 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/Makefile +++ b/drivers/misc/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_heap.o lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_perms.o lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_rodata_objcopy.o lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_usercopy.o +lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_stackleak.o KCOV_INSTRUMENT_lkdtm_rodata.o := n diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h index 3b4976396ec4..3b67cc4a070b 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h @@ -64,4 +64,8 @@ void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM(void); void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND(void); void lkdtm_USERCOPY_KERNEL(void); +/* lkdtm_stackleak.c */ +void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ALLOCA(void); +void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_BIG_FRAME(void); + #endif diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c index 42d2b8e31e6b..f42b346bdf5c 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c @@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ struct crashtype crashtypes[] = { CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM), CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND), CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_KERNEL), + CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_ALLOCA), + CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_BIG_FRAME), }; diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2fa44c641d11 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* + * This file tests a few aspects of the stackleak compiler plugin: + * - the current task stack somewhere below lowest_stack is properly canaried + * - small allocas are allowed properly via check_alloca() + * - big allocations that exhaust the stack are BUG()s + * - function calls whose stack frames blow the stack are BUG()s + * + * Copyright (C) Docker, Inc. 2017 + * + * Author: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com> + */ + +#include "lkdtm.h" + +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/compiler.h> + +/* for security_inode_init_security */ +#include <linux/security.h> + +#ifndef STACKLEAK_POISON +# define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF +#endif + +static bool check_poison(unsigned long *ptr, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long i; + + for (i = 1; i < n; i++) { + if (*(ptr - i) != STACKLEAK_POISON) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool check_my_stack(void) +{ + unsigned long *lowest, left, i; + + lowest = &i; + left = (unsigned long) lowest % THREAD_SIZE; + + /* + * See note in arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S about the or; the bottom two + * qwords are not + */ + left -= 2 * sizeof(unsigned long); + + /* let's count the number of canaries, not bytes */ + left /= sizeof(unsigned long); + + for (i = 0; i < left; i++) { + if (*(lowest - i) != STACKLEAK_POISON) + continue; + + if (!check_poison(lowest - i, 16)) + continue; + + break; + } + + if (i == left) { + pr_warn("didn't find canary?"); + return false; + } + + if (check_poison((unsigned long *) lowest - i, left - i)) { + pr_info("current stack poisoned correctly\n"); + return true; + } else { + pr_err("current stack not poisoned correctly\n"); + return false; + } +} + +static noinline void do_alloca(unsigned long size, void (*todo)(void)) +{ + char buf[size]; + + if (todo) + todo(); + + /* so this doesn't get inlined or optimized out */ + snprintf(buf, size, "hello world\n"); +} + +/* Check the BUG() in check_alloca() */ +void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ALLOCA(void) +{ + unsigned long left = (unsigned long) &left % THREAD_SIZE; + + if (!check_my_stack()) + return; + + /* try a small allocation to see if it works */ + do_alloca(16, NULL); + pr_info("small allocation successful\n"); + + + pr_info("attempting large alloca of %lu\n", left); + do_alloca(left, NULL); + pr_err("FAIL: large alloca succeded!\n"); +} + +static void use_some_stack(void) { + + /* + * Note: this needs to be a(n exported) function that has track_stack + * inserted, i.e. it isn't in the various sections restricted by + * stackleak_track_stack_gate. + */ + security_inode_init_security(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); +} + +/* + * Note that the way this test fails is kind of ugly; it hits the BUG() in + * track_stack, but then the BUG() handler blows the stack and hits the stack + * guard page. + */ +void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_BIG_FRAME(void) +{ + unsigned long left = (unsigned long) &left % THREAD_SIZE; + + if (!check_my_stack()) + return; + + /* + * use almost all of the stack up to the padding allowed by track_stack + */ + do_alloca(left - THREAD_SIZE / 16 - 1, use_some_stack); + pr_err("FAIL: stack frame should have blown stack!\n"); +} -- 2.11.0
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