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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJzz69cGv-nJt_GaGuOiv4Et2K9ahGEmg282ySPGhbKPw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 10:50:20 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
Cc: Li Kun <hw.likun@...wei.com>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH untested] arm64: kernel: implement fast refcount checking
On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 10:20 AM, Ard Biesheuvel
<ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org> wrote:
> On 25 July 2017 at 18:13, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>> On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 4:49 AM, Ard Biesheuvel
>> <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org> wrote:
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> I had a stab at porting the fast refcount checks to arm64. It is slightly
>>> less straight-forward than x86 given that we need to support both LSE and
>>> LL/SC, and fallback to the latter if running a kernel built with support
>>> for the former on hardware that does not support it.
>>>
>>> It is build tested with and without LSE support, and boots fine on non-LSE
>>> hardware in both cases.
>>
>> Ah! Very cool. Hopefully you and Li can compare notes; I think they've
>> been working on an implementation too.
>>
>
> I wasn't aware of that.
>
>>> Suggestions welcome as to how to test and/or benchmark this,
>>
>> I'll post a patch for LKDTM that I've been using. It's more
>> comprehensive than the existing ATOMIC checks (which predated the
>> refcount-only protection).
>>
>
> OK. One thing I couldn't figure out: is refcount_t signed or not? The
> saturate tests set the initial value to UINT_MAX - 1, but this is
> interpreted as a negative value and so the refcount manipulations that
> are expected to succeed also fail in my case.
refcount_t under REFCOUNT_FULL is unsigned. Under the x86 fast
refcount, it's signed to gain the CPU flag detection for overflow. The
understanding is basically "omg, if you've got INT_MAX-many references
to something you already DoSed your machine".
I'll have the full LKDTM tests up in a moment here, just doing another
pass on them now...
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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