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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1707060841170.23867@east.gentwo.org> Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 08:43:19 -0500 (CDT) From: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@...aro.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>, Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>, Helge Deller <deller@....de>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation On Wed, 5 Jul 2017, Kees Cook wrote: > @@ -3536,6 +3565,9 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, unsigned long flags) > { > s->flags = kmem_cache_flags(s->size, flags, s->name, s->ctor); > s->reserved = 0; > +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED > + s->random = get_random_long(); > +#endif > > if (need_reserve_slab_rcu && (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)) > s->reserved = sizeof(struct rcu_head); > So if an attacker knows the internal structure of data then he can simply dereference page->kmem_cache->random to decode the freepointer. Assuming someone is already targeting a freelist pointer (which indicates detailed knowledge of the internal structure) then I would think that someone like that will also figure out how to follow the pointer links to get to the random value. Not seeing the point of all of this.
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