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Message-ID: <20170629175647.pufnks75fqy627jv@smitten>
Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2017 11:56:47 -0600
From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>
To: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@...aro.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@....de>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v2] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer
obfuscation
On Thu, Jun 29, 2017 at 01:54:13PM -0400, Rik van Riel wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-06-29 at 10:47 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 29, 2017 at 10:05 AM, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>
> > wrote:
> > > On Sun, 25 Jun 2017, Kees Cook wrote:
> > >
> > > > The difference gets lost in the noise, but if the above is
> > > > sensible,
> > > > it's 0.07% slower. ;)
> > >
> > > Hmmm... These differences add up. Also in a repetative benchmark
> > > like that
> > > you do not see the impact that the additional cacheline use in the
> > > cpu
> > > cache has on larger workloads. Those may be pushed over the edge of
> > > l1 or
> > > l2 capacity at some point which then causes drastic regressions.
> >
> > Even if that is true, it may be worth it to some people to have the
> > protection. Given that is significantly hampers a large class of heap
> > overflow attacks[1], I think it's an important change to have. I'm
> > not
> > suggesting this be on by default, it's cleanly behind
> > CONFIG-controlled macros, and is very limited in scope. If you can
> > Ack
> > it we can let system builders decide if they want to risk a possible
> > performance hit. I'm pretty sure most distros would like to have this
> > protection.
>
> I could certainly see it being useful for all kinds of portable
> and network-connected systems where security is simply much
> more important than performance.
Indeed, I believe we would enable this in our kernels.
Cheers,
Tycho
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